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STATEMENT QF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(4) (2002), transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Consequently, the Utah Court of Appeals is conferred with 
jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3 (2) (j) (2002) . 
STATEMENT QF ISSUES / STANDARDS QF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred by deeming trespassers to 
be members of the public whose use could and did ripen into a 
public way. "When reviewing a trial court's decision regarding 
whether a public highway has been established . . . , [the 
appellate court] review[s] the decision for correctness but 
grant[s] the court significant discretion in its application of 
the facts to the statute." Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P. 2d 
307, 310 (Utah 1997). However, the trial court's application of 
the law is a legal determination reviewed for correction of error. 
State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994) (when reviewing "a 
trial court's determination of the law[,] . . . [an] appellate 
court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any 
degree to the trial judge's determination of law"); see also AWINC 
Corp. v. Simonsen, 2005 UT App 176, 1[8. 
6 
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for R&vjw. 
Trial counsel, among other citations set forth in the record on 
appeal, preserved this issue by way of the continuing objection 
and arguments set forth in the record in passim and at R. 
1646:1197-98, et seg. 
2. Whether the trial court misinterpreted and misapplied 
the law of continuous use as it pertains to dedication by 
concluding that the Bennie Creek Road had been continuously used 
by the public. "When reviewing a trial court's decision regarding 
whether a public highway has been established . . . , [the 
appellate court] review[s] the decision for correctness but 
grant[s] the court significant discretion in its application of 
the facts to the statute." Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 
307, 310 (Utah 1997). Nevertheless, the trial court's application 
of the law is a legal determination reviewed for correction of 
error. State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994) (when 
reviewing "a trial court's determination of the law[,] . . . [an] 
appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer 
in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law"); see 
also AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 2005 UT App 176, \8. To 
successfully challenge a finding, the appellant "must marshal the 
evidence in support of the finding[] and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, the trial court's finding[] [is] so lacking 
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in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence, ' 
thus making [it] 'clearly erroneous.'" Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 
961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). 
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review: 
Trial counsel, among other citations set forth in the record on 
appeal, preserved this issue by way of the continuing objection 
and arguments set forth in the record in passim and at R. 
1646:1222, et seq. 
3. Whether the trial court erred, as a matter of law, by 
failing to specifically identify the requisite ten-year period of 
time as dictated by the dedication statute. "When reviewing a 
trial court's decision regarding whether a public highway has been 
established . . ., [the appellate court] review[s] the decision 
for correctness but grant[s] the court significant discretion in 
its application of the facts to the statute." Heber City Corp. v. 
Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 310 (Utah 1997). The trial court's 
application or interpretation of the law is a legal determination 
reviewed for correction of error. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
935-36 (Utah 1994) (when reviewing "a trial court's determination 
of the law[,] . . . [an] appellate court decides the matter for 
itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's 
determination of law"); see also AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 2005 UT 
App 176, %8. 
8 
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review: 
Trial counsel, among other citations set forth in the record on 
appeal, preserved this issue by way of the continuing objection 
and arguments set forth in the record in passim and at R. 
1646:1200:8-15, et seg. 
4. The trial court abused its discretion by failing to rule 
on Defendants' Objections to the proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order. An appellate court reviews a trial 
court's ruling on a post-trial motion or objection to proposed 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for abuse of 
discretion. See Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 428 (Utah 1998); 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994) ("At the extreme end 
of the discretion spectrum would be a decision by the trial court 
to grant or deny a new trial based on insufficiency of the 
evidence.") . 
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review: 
Trial counsel, among other citations set forth in the record on 
appeal, preserved this issue by way of the filing of an Objection 
to the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order as 
set forth in the record at R. 1480-86. 
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative, 
are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body 
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellants. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves critical questions concerning the required 
elements for dedication and abandonment of a road to the use of 
the public. In this case, the trial court misinterpreted and 
misapplied the law in the course of rendering its decision. 
In October 2000, Plaintiffs, Utah County and the State of 
Utah, sued Defendants, as property owners, alleging illegal 
closure of a public road and easement as well as unjust 
enrichment. In conjunction, Plaintiffs sought a determination by 
the court that the route described as the Bennie Creek Road be 
deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the 
public pursuant to statute. Plaintiffs moved for a temporary 
restraining order, which the district court denied. Defendants 
denied the allegations concerning dedication and abandonment of 
the road. 
Pursuant to an agreement to mediate the case, the parties 
appeared for mediation, at the conclusion of which a "Settlement 
10 
Agreement" was executed. Sometime thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a 
Motion and Memorandum to Enforce Settlement Agreement, to which 
Defendants responded in opposition. 
The district court subsequently signed an Order approving a 
stipulation between Defendants Margaret Condley, Michael E. 
Condley, and Elizabeth Condley and dismissing them with prejudice 
from the lawsuit. 
The parties, on February 2, 2004, appeared for an evidentiary 
hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, 
which the district court denied, requested further briefing, and 
set the case for trial. After supplemental briefing, the district 
court again determined the Settlement Agreement to be 
unenforceable. 
The remaining parties appeared before the district court over 
the course of several days for a bench trial in June 2004. On 
June 16, 2004, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision, 
concluding that the Bennie Creek Road had been dedicated and 
abandoned to the use of the public. 
Plaintiff's counsel submitted proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order. Defendants filed an Objection to 
the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order and 
requested oral argument on the objections. In response, 
Plaintiffs opposed the request for oral argument and, in the 
11 
alternative, requested an expedited hearing in addition to a 
request for attorney fees. Plaintiffs, on August 16, 2004, also 
filed a Notice to Submit for Decision. That same day, the 
district court signed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order, which were entered that same day. 
In their Verified Memorandum of Costs, Plaintiffs requested 
that the district court award them "on half [sic] of the cost for 
the mediator for a total of $650.00", in addition to $74.00 for 
witness fees for four witnesses utilized by Plaintiffs during the 
hearing on their Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement. 
Defendants again objected. Plaintiffs responded and filed a 
Notice to Submit for Decision. 
Defendants Randy Butler, Donna Butler, Blaine Evans and Linda 
Evans, through counsel, on September 15, 2 0 04, filed Notice of 
Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. 
By way of Order, the district court awarded the costs of suit 
requested by Plaintiffs. 
The Utah Supreme Court subsequently transferred the appeal to 
the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). 
On September 27, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Cross-
Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from paragraph 6 of the district 
court's Order. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In October 2 000, Utah County and the State of Utah, as 
Plaintiffs, sued Randy and Donna Butler, as property owners, 
alleging illegal closure of a public road and easement as well as 
unjust enrichment (R. 1-12). As part of their Complaint, 
Plaintiffs sought a judicial determination that the route 
described as the Bennie Creek Road be deemed to have been 
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 72-5-1041 and its predecessor statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 27-12-89 (R. 6). 
2. In conjunction with the Complaint, Utah County and the 
State of Utah moved for a temporary restraining order (R. 96-98) , 
which the district court denied (R. 118-20). 
3. By Answer, the Butlers specifically denied the 
allegations underlying the request for dedication and abandonment 
of the road (R. 125-30) . 
4. Pursuant to motion and order, Utah County and the State 
of Utah subsequently amended their Complaint to include other 
pertinent property owners and John Does claiming an interest in 
the Bennie Creed Road (R. 186-99) . 
^ee Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (2001), a true and correct copy 
of which is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
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5. All the Defendants thereafter answered and specifically 
denied the allegations contained in the Amended Complaint (R. 268-
77) . 
6. During a pretrial conference on July 17, 2002, the 
parties agreed to mediate the case (R. 830-31) . 
7. On August 20, 2002, a mediation was held before a 
mediator, at the conclusion of which a "Settlement Agreement" was 
executed (R. 1005) . 
8. Thereafter, on April 2, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a Motion 
and Memorandum to Enforce Settlement Agreement (R. 895-1006). 
Defendants responded in opposition to the Motion (R. 1066-74). 
9. On October 1, 2003, the district court signed an Order 
approving a stipulation between Defendants Margaret Condley, 
Michael E. Condley, and Elizabeth Condley and dismissing them with 
prejudice from the lawsuit (R. 1201-18). 
10. On February 2, 2004, the parties appeared for an 
evidentiary hearing on the Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, 
after which the district court denied Plaintiffs' Motion, 
requested further briefing, and set the case for trial (R. 1285-
89) . 
11. On April 27, 2004, after supplemental briefing by the 
parties, the district court again determined the Settlement 
Agreement to be unenforceable (R. 13 72). 
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12. The remaining parties appeared before the district court 
over the course of several days for a bench trial in June 2 004 (R. 
1442-55) . 
13. On June 16, 2004, the district court issued a Memorandum 
Decision, concluding that the Bennie Creek Road had been dedicated 
and abandoned to the use of the public pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 72-5-104 and its predecessor statute, Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89 
(R. 1456-73) . See Memorandum Decision, R. 1456-73, a true and 
correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum B. 
14. Thereafter, Plaintiff's counsel submitted proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (R. 1507). 
15. Defendants filed an Objection to the proposed Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order and requested oral argument 
on the objections (R. 1480-86). See Defendants' Objection to 
Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order and Request for Oral Argument, R. 14 80-86, a true and 
correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum C. 
16. Plaintiffs responded to Defendants' Objection and 
opposed the request for oral argument and, in the alternative, 
requested an expedited hearing in addition to their request for 
attorney fees (R. 1486-1503). See Response to Defendants' 
Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact an [sic] 
Conclusions of Law and Request for Oral Argument; Objection to 
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Request for Oral Argument, or in the Alternative, Request for 
Expedited Hearing; Request for Attorney's Fees, R. 1486-1503, a 
true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum D. 
17. With their response, Plaintiffs, on August 16, 2004, 
filed a Notice to Submit for Decision (R. 1504-06) . 
18. That same day, the district court signed the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, which were entered that same 
day (R. 1507-26). See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order, R. 1507-26, a true and correct copy of which is attached 
hereto as Addendum E. 
19. Plaintiffs thereafter filed a Verified Memorandum of 
Costs, requesting, among other things, that the district court 
award Plaintiffs "on half [sic] of the cost for the mediator for 
a total of $650.00", in addition to $74.00 for witness fees for 
four witnesses utilized by Plaintiffs during the hearing on their 
Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement (R. 1527-29) . 
20. Defendants filed an Objection to the proposed costs of 
suit (R. 1530-34). Plaintiffs responded and filed a Notice to 
Submit for Decision (R. 1535-1616; R. 1617-19). 
21. Defendants Randy Butler, Donna Butler, Blaine Evans, and 
Linda Evans, through counsel, on September 15, 2004, filed Notice 
of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court (R. 1620-23). See R. 1620-23, 
Notice of Appeal, attached hereto as Addendum F. 
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22. By way of Order, dated September 20, 2004, the district 
court awarded the costs of suit requested by Plaintiffs (R. 1624-
27) . 
23. On September 23, 2004, the Utah Supreme Court 
transferred the appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). 
24. On September 27, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of 
Cross-Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from paragraph 6 of the 
district court's Order (R. 1630-31). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court erred by deeming trespassers to be 
members of the public whose use could and did ripen into a public 
way. Trespassers are not members of the public for purposes of 
dedication and abandonment of private property for public use. 
The totality of the circumstances in the instant case demonstrates 
that most of the witnesses utilized by Plaintiffs' were 
trespassers. As such, those witnesses did not constitute members 
of the public for purposes of establishing dedication and 
abandonment of the Bennie Creek Road for the public use pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104. By refusing to apply common law 
trespass to the elements of dedication set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
17 
§ 72-5-104, the trial court misinterpreted the requisite elements 
as they applied to the instant case. 
By refusing to apply common law trespassing principles to the 
requisite elements of dedication, the trial court impermissibly 
relieved Plaintiffs of their burden to prove dedication by clear 
and convincing evidence and thereby shifted the burden to 
Defendants, as property owners, to prove otherwise. Further, the 
trial court's refusal to apply the law of trespass ignored the 
well-established presumption to be employed in favor of property 
owners, which is due to the high-degree of sanctity and respect of 
property ownership. 
2. The trial court misinterpreted and misapplied the 
underlying law of "continuous use" as it pertains to dedication by 
concluding that the Bennie Creek Road had been continuously used 
by the public. In the instant case, the trial court 
misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 and misapplied the 
underlying legal principles of the statute pertaining to the 
elements of "continuous use" as a "public thoroughfare" when it 
determined that the Bennie Creek Road was in continuous use by the 
public as a public thoroughfare. 
3. The trial court erred, as a matter of law, by failing to 
specifically identify the requisite ten-year period of time as 
dictated by the dedication statute. By failing to specifically 
18 
pinpoint a 10-year period of time as required by the dedication 
statute, the trial court misinterpreted the statute and thereby 
impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to Defendants, as 
landowners. This failure by the trial court also ignored the 
presumption to be employed in favor of the Defendants, as 
landowners. 
4. The trial court abused its discretion by failing to rule 
on Defendants' objections to the proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order. By failing to specifically rule on 
Defendants' substantial objections, which challenged the proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, for, among other 
things, insufficiency of the evidence, the trial court abused its 
discretion. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DEEMING TRESPASSERS 
TO BE MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC WHOSE USE COULD 
AND DID RIPEN INTO A PUBLIC WAY. 
A. Legal Principles Surrounding Dedication 
and Abandonment to the Use of the 
Public. 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (2001) provides, "A highway is 
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been 
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten 
years." See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) (2001). 
19 
Notwithstanding, w[t]he law does not lightly allow the transfer of 
property from private to public use." Draper City v. Estate of 
Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995). 
The taking of property in circumstances such as that in the 
instant case "requires proof of dedication by clear and convincing 
evidence." Id. (citing Thomson v. Condas, 2 7 Utah 2d 12 9, 13 0, 
493 P.2d 639, 639 (1972); Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 377-
78, 438 P.2d 545, 548 (1968)). "This higher standard of proof is 
demanded since the ownership of property should be granted a high 
degree of sanctity and respect." Id. (citing Petersen, 438 P.2d 
at 548-49 (Crockett, C.J., dissenting)). 
Additionally, "x [t]he presumption is in favor of the property 
owner; and the burden of establishing public use for the required 
period of time is on those claiming it.'" Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. 
v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211, 213 (Utah 1981) (quoting 
Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 Utah 2d 140, 143, 417 P.2d 646, 648 (1966)). 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104, "'the highway, even though it be 
over privately owned ground, will be deemed dedicated or abandoned 
to the public use when the public has continuously used it as a 
thoroughfare for a period of 10 years, but such use must be by the 
public.'" Thompson v. Nelson, 2 Utah 2d 340, 345, 273 P. 2d 720, 
723 (1954) (quoting Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 251, 161 P. 
1127, 1131 (1916)). 
20 
B. Trespassers Are Not Members of the 
Public for Purposes of Dedication and 
Abandonment of Private Property for 
Public Use. 
The record in the instant case demonstrates, at the very 
least, that a substantial number of Plaintiffs' witnesses utilized 
at trial were trespassers on Defendants' property (see, e.g., R. 
1639:39:7-12; R. 1639:55:9-12; R. 1639:71-72; R. 1640:232-33; R. 
1640:287:3-7; R. 1640:347:4-21; R. 1640:378:16-21; R. 1641:509:9-
17; R. 1642:709:16). The landowners, among other things, posted 
"no trespassing" signs (see, e.g., id.), placed gates across the 
road (see, e.g., R. 1642:710:18), and called the county sheriff to 
have the trespassers removed (see, e.g., R. 1645:1073:11-17). 
According to common law trespass, "[t]he essential element of 
trespass is physical invasion of the land; x[t]respass is a 
possessory action.'" Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 
P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1998) (quoting John Price Assocs., Inc. v. 
Utah State Conf., Bricklayers Locals Nos. 1, 2 & 6, 615 P.2d 1210, 
1214 (Utah 1980) and citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 
(1977)); see also Wood v. Myrup, 681 P.2d 1255, 1257 (Utah 1984). 
Trespass is a "wrongful entry . . . upon the lands of another." 
See O'Neill v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R. Co., 38 Utah 475, 479, 114 
P. 127, 128 (1911). 
21 
The totality of the aforementioned circumstances demonstrates 
that most of the witnesses utilized by Plaintiffs' were 
trespassers. As such, those witnesses did not constitute members 
of the public for purposes of establishing dedication and 
abandonment of the Bennie Creek Road for the public use pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104. By refusing to apply common law 
trespass to the elements of dedication set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 72-5-104, the trial court misinterpreted the requisite elements 
as they applied to the instant case. 
C. By Refusing to Apply Common Law Trespass 
Principles to the Requisite Elements of 
Dedication, the Trial Court Not Only 
Impermissibly Relieved Plaintiffs of 
Their Burden But It Ignored the 
Presumption to be Employed in Favor of 
Property Owners. 
According to well-established legal principles underlying the 
dedication and abandonment of private property to the public use, 
the Plaintiffs had the burden to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that those traveling the Bennie Creek Road were not 
trespassers. Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P. 2d 1097, 
1099 (Utah 1995); Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) . By refusing to apply common law trespassing 
principles to the requisite elements of dedication, the trial 
court impermissibly relieved Plaintiffs of their burden to prove 
dedication by clear and convincing evidence and thereby shifted 
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the burden to Defendants, as property owners, to prove otherwise. 
Further, the trial court's refusal to apply the law of trespass 
ignored the well-established presumption to be employed in favor 
of property owners, which is due to the high-degree of sanctity 
and respect of property ownership. Cf. Draper City, 888 P.2d at 
1099; Campbell, 962 P.2d at 808. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT MISINTERPRETED AND MISAPPLIED 
THE UNDERLYING LAW OF "CONTINUOUS USE" AS IT 
PERTAINS TO DEDICATION BY CONCLUDING THAT THE 
BENNIE CREEK ROAD HAD BEEN CONTINUOUSLY USED 
BY THE PUBLIC. 
Three elements or factors must be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence for a private road to be dedicated for public 
use pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104: '"there must be (i) 
continuous use, (ii) as a public thoroughfare, (iii) for a period 
of ten years.'" Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 
P.2d 307, 310 (Utah 1997)). For the "continuous use" element to 
be properly established, the public must have "made a continuous 
and uninterrupted use . . . as often as they found it convenient 
or necessary." Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 326 P.2d 107, 109 
(1958). "[U]se may be continuous though not constant . . . . 
provided it occurred as often as the claimant had occasion or 
chose to pass. Mere intermission is not interruption." Richards 
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v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948, 949 (Utah 1977) (citation 
omitted). In summary, "under the continuous use requirement, 
members of the public must have been able to use the road whenever 
they found it necessary or convenient." Campbell, 962 P. 2d at 
809. 
The trial court, in the instant case, acknowledged that use 
of the Bennie Creek Road was interrupted "by naturally occurring 
conditions such as groundwater (spring water) in wet years and 
snow in the winter." (R. 1470). Moreover, the trial court 
conceded in its Memorandum Decision that witnesses at trial 
testified "that there were locked gates on the road." (R. 1469). 
In fact, the trial court mentioned that "[t]here was testimony 
regarding four gates on the Benny [sic] Creek road between U.S. 
Highway 89 and the Uintah National Forest." (R. 1465) (Emphasis 
added). More pointedly, the trial court stated, "Virgil Neeves 
testified that between 1958 and 1980 there was a locked gate near 
the Gardner home (the last home traveling west toward the forest 
service property, now occupied by Defendant Randy Butler) which 
was locked most of the time." (R. 1467-68).2 
2The trial court also noted that Mr. Neeves "saw people stuck on 
the road and recalls a cable across the road to stop cars." The 
trial court, however, without explanation, refused to consider this 
testimonial evidence, deeming it as "simply confused and inconsistent 
with all of the other testimony about obstructions on the road in 
question." (R. 1468). 
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Additionally, the trial court, in its Memorandum Decision, 
specifically noted that Mr. Mike Condley, who had lived in the 
area from 1970 until 1979, "firmly recalled a locked gate near the 
Gardner (Butler) home." (R. 1468). Shortly thereafter in its 
Decision, the trial court also acknowledged that Defendant Blaine 
Evans and others put the locked gates farther west, near the 
present cattle guard between the Butler home and forest service 
property." (R. 1467). 
In addition to the gates, the trial court conceded that there 
"was substantial testimony about ["no trespassing"] signs along 
the road" and other locations "designating the area as private 
property." (R. 1466; see also R. 1639:39:7-12; R. 1639:55:9-12; R. 
1639:71-72; R. 1640:232-33; R. 1640:287:3-7; R. 1640:347:4-21; R. 
1640:378:16-21; R. 1641:509:9-17; R. 1642:709:16). Further, the 
Defendants, as landowners, called the county sheriff to have 
various individuals removed from their property, as trespassers 
(see, e.g., R. 1645:1073:11-17; see also R. 1466). 
Travel to the Forest Service land by way of the Bennie Creek 
Road was also precluded by what was commonly referred to as a bog 
in the road, which was the result of springs or ditches (R. 1462) . 
This bog, according to the record, made travel on the Bennie Creek 
Road difficult, if not impossible, during "certain seasons or 
certain times between 1925 and 1980" (R. 1462) . 
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Finally, the unrebutted testimony at trial established that 
the road "is periodically used to deliver irrigation water to 
property along the road and that when that occurs, the road 
becomes impassable." (R. 1466) .3 According to testimony, the road 
was used from 1950 through 1993 as the irrigation ditch to 
transport water to the property owners' pastures on both sides of 
the road (R. 1644:944:17-25; R. 1644:970:6-9). The testimony at 
trial established that "about every three weeks" the road would be 
utilized for irrigation purposes "[f]or approximately six days" at 
a time (R. 1644:974:11-20). 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the trial court found that 
"neither the Gardner family nor the Otteson (Roach) families used 
that method or irrigation covering a period from 1925 to 1981." 
(R. 1466; R. 1518, fl8). To successfully challenge a finding, the 
appellant "must marshal the evidence in support of the finding [] 
and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
finding [] [is] so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear 
weight of the evidence,' thus making [it] 'clearly erroneous.'" 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1997) (citations 
omitted). There is no evidence to marshal in support of 
aforementioned finding. Thus, in light of the aforementioned 
3The irrigation practices of the landowners were performed 
pursuant to "diligence rights" established in 1850 (R. 1645:1093:1-
4) . 
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testimony and citations to the record, the trial court's finding 
is clearly erroneous. 
The trial court, in the instant case, misinterpreted Utah 
Code Ann. § 72-5-104 and misapplied the underlying legal 
principles of the statute pertaining to the elements of 
"continuous use" as a "public thoroughfare" when it determined 
that the Bennie Creek Road was in continuous use by the public as 
a public thoroughfare. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, BY 
FAILING TO SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFY THE 
REQUISITE TEN-YEAR PERIOD OF TIME AS DICTATED 
BY THE DEDICATION STATUTE. 
Continuous use by the public for ten years is required before 
private property can be dedicated or abandoned to the public use. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) (2001); Campbell v. Box Elder 
County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The trial court, 
in the instant case, failed to specifically identify such a ten-
year period of time. 
In the case at bar, the trial court concluded that "the 
evidence is clear and convincing that for at least 10 years prior 
to 1958 the road was open and traveled by the public as often as 
necessary or convenient . . . ." (R. 1470). The trial court 
stated that 
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even if it is concluded (which this Court 
does not) that the road was gated and locked 
in the late 50's and early 60's as described 
by the Butlers, the road was used as 
necessary and convenient by the public for 
more than 10 years before that time and, 
again, 10 years after that time." 
(R. 1461; see also R. 1515, 1f2 8) . 
By failing to specifically pinpoint a 10-year period of time 
as required by the dedication statute, the trial court 
misinterpreted the statute and thereby impermissibly shifted the 
burden of proof to Defendants, as landowners. This failure by the 
trial court also ignored the presumption to be employed in favor 
of the Defendants, as landowners. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
FAILING TO RULE ON DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS TO 
THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, AND ORDER. 
The trial court's ruling on a post-trial motion or objection 
to proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 
425, 428 (Utah 1998); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994) 
("At the extreme end of the discretion spectrum would be a 
decision by the trial court to grant or deny a new trial based on 
insufficiency of the evidence."). 
On June 16, 2 004, the district court issued a Memorandum 
Decision, concluding that the Bennie Creek Road had been dedicated 
28 
and abandoned to the use of the public pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 72-5-104 and its predecessor statute, Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89. 
Thereafter, Plaintiff's counsel submitted proposed Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
Defendants filed an Objection to the proposed Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order and requested oral argument on 
the objections. Plaintiffs responded to Defendants' Objection and 
opposed the request for oral argument and, in the alternative, 
requested an expedited hearing in addition to their request for 
attorney fees. With their response, Plaintiffs, on August 16, 
2004, filed a Notice to Submit for Decision. Nevertheless, the 
district court, that same day, without hearing or explanation, 
signed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, which 
were entered that same day. 
The trial court abused its discretion by failing to 
specifically rule on Defendants' substantial objections 
challenging the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order, for, among other things, insufficiency of the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants Randy Butler, Donna 
Butler, Blaine Evans, and Linda Evans, respectfully request that 
this Court reverse the trial court's determination that Bennie 
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Creek Road was dedicated and abandoned to the public use and 
remand the case to the district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this Court's instructions as set forth in its 
opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day o^June, 2005. 
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Tab A 
RIGHTS-OF-WAY 72-5-104 
(b) If the highway is a county road, city street under joint title as 
provided in Subsection 72-3-104(3), or right-of-way described in Title 72, 
Chapter 5, Par t 3, Rights-of-way Across Federal Lands Act, title to all 
interests in real property less than fee simple held under this section is 
held jointly by the state and the county, city, or town holding the interest. 
(3) A transfer of land bounded by a highway on a right-of-way for which the 
public has only an easement passes the title of the person whose estate is 
transferred to the middle of the highway. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 101; 1991, ch. 
137, § 29; C. 1953, 27-12-101; renumbered 
by L. 1998, ch . 270, § 131; 2000, ch. 324, § 6; 
2001, ch. 79, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered 
this section, which formerly appeared as § 
27-12-101, and added new Subsection (1), mak-
ing related changes in subsection designation. 
The 2000 amendment, effective March 16, 
2000, added Subsection (2Kb), making a related 
change. 
The 2001 amendment, effective March 9, 
2001, added Subsections (2)(aXii) and (2)(a)(iii) 
and the (2)(a)(i) designation and substituted 
"transportation purposes" for "highway pur-
poses" in Subsections (1) and (2)(a)(i). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Rights of public and abutting owners. 
Vacation of road. 
Cited. 
Rights of public and abutt ing owners . 
Erection of electric power lines on public 
highway right-of-way, the fee to which is not in 
the public but in the owner of the abutting 
property, is within the purview of the easement 
for highway purposes and is not an additional 
servitude for which the abutting owner is en-
titled to compensation. Pickett v. California 
Pac. Utils., 619 P.2d 325 (Utah 1980). 
Statutes regulating water mains in relation 
to highways clearly indicated tha t legislature 
did not regard dedication of a street in a platted 
subdivision as the surrender of an easement 
with retention of the fee in the abutting owner. 
White v. Salt Lake City, 121 Utah 134, 239 P.2d 
210(1952). 
Vacation of road. 
When city vacated street property which was 
never used by the public and never platted as a 
street on the official records, the parties owning 
the land abutting on either side of such prop-
erty were entitled to fee simple interests to the 
center line of the "street," because the grantor 
who deeded the street property to the city was 
also the grantor of the abutting landowners, 
and no intention to the contrary appeared in 
any of the original deeds. Fenton v. Cedar 
Lumber & Hdwe. Co., 17 Utah 2d 99, 404 P.2d 
966 (1965). 
Property developers' dedication of land for 
public rights-of-way in a plat of a subdivision 
gave a defeasible fee interest to the county in 
the land dedicated for the road and, once the 
county vacated the road, the abutting property 
owner succeeded to the fee simple title of that 
land. Falula Farms, Inc. v. Ludlow, 866 P.2d 
569 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Cited in Nelson v. Provo City, 2000 UT App 
205, 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 20. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Highways, 
Streets, and Bridges § 183. 
C.J.S. — 39A C.J.S. Highways § 136. 
72-5-104. Public use constituting dedication — Scope. 
(1) A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it 
has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years. 
(2) The dedication and abandonment creates a right-of-way held by the 
state in accordance with Sections 72-3-102, 72-3-104, 72-3-105, and 72-5-103. 
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(3) The scope of the right-of-way is that which is reasonable and necessary 
to ensure safe travel according to the f&cts and circumstances. 
History: L. 1963, ch . 39, § 89; C. 1953, 
27-12-89; renumbered by L. 1998, ch. 270, 
§ 132; 2000, ch . 324, § 7. 
Amendment Notes . — The 1998 amend-
ment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered 
this section, which formerly appeared as § 
27-12-89. 
The 2000 amendment, effective March 16 
2000, substituted "is" for "shall be deemed ta 
have been" in Subsection (1) and added Subsec-
tions (2) and (3). 
NOTES TO PECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Acceptance. 
Burden of proof. 
Change in highway 
Control by landowners. 
Estoppel. 
Evidence. 
Generally. 
Intent of landowner. 
—Necessary. 
—Not necessary. 
Private rights. 
"Public" defined. 
Rights granted to public. 
Rights of subsequent grantees. 
Sufficiency of proof of dedication. 
"TlvoYQMghfaxe" and "puhlvc thoroughfare" dis-
tinguished. 
Width of roadway. 
Acceptance . 
When owner of land deeded it to city for 
public use but city never accepted it, no dedica-
tion took place and claim of purchaser from city 
was invalid as against subsequent purchaser 
from original owner of land. William J. Lemp 
Brewing Co. v. P.J. Moran, Inc., 51 Utah 178, 
169 P. 459 (1917). 
Burden of proof. 
Where claim is made that a highway has 
been dedicated to public use, there is a pre-
sumption in favor of the property owner and 
the burden of establishing public use for the 
required period of t ime is on those claiming it. 
Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow 
Ranches, 639 P.2d 211 (Utah 1981). 
Change in highway. 
A public highway over public lands is estab-
lished, although there has been no official ac-
ceptance, when it has been used for longer than 
ten years; if travel has remained substantially 
unchanged^ and practical identity of road pre-
served, tha t is sufficient, although there may 
have been slight deviations from the common 
way. Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v. 
Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 285 P. 646 (1929). 
Slight change in course of highway or of its 
location that does not materially change or 
affect the general course thereof or affect its 
location, nor break or change the continuity of 
travel or use, does not constitute abandonment 
or affect public nature of highway. Sullivan v. 
Condas, 76 Utah 585, 290 P. 954 (1930). 
Control by landowners . 
No dedication was shown under identically 
worded predecessor section where it appeared 
that an alleyway which had more or less been 
used by the public at will for a number of years 
had from time to time been closed by the 
abutting owners, who had at all times exercised 
control over it. Culmer v. Salt Lake City, 27 
Utah 252, 75 P. 620 (1904). 
Estoppel . 
Municipality may be estopped from asserting 
dedication by acts and conduct that have been 
relied on by others to their prejudice and, 
likewise, private individual may be estopped in 
the same way where he stands by and permits 
others to improve land claimed to have been 
dedicated. Premium Oil Co. v. Cedar City, 112 
Utah 324, 187 P.2d 199 (1947). 
Evidence. 
Evidence showing, among other things, that 
roadwa}' was used continuously for recreational 
and agricultural purposes and for access to 
other business activities supported the trial 
court's ruling that the roadway was dedicated 
or abandoned to the public. Kohler v. Martin, 
916 P.2d 910 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Generally. 
Where all three elements under this section 
for the establishment of a public highway were 
satisfied, the court had no discretion to ignore 
that fact and erred in concluding that a road 
was not a public highway. Heber City Corp. v. 
Simpson, 942 P.2d 307 (Utah 1997). 
Intent. *>i tandowrax. 
—Necessary. 
In order for a private road to become a public 
thoroughfare there must be evidence of intent 
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by the owner to dedicate the road to a public 
use and an acceptance by the public. Such 
intent may be inferred from declarations, acts 
or circumstances and use by the general public. 
Gillmor v. Carter, 15 Utah 2d 280, 391 P.2d 426 
(1964) (but see cases noted under "—Not nec-
essary" below). 
For cases discussing landowner's intent to 
dedicate road to public use, see Wilson v. Hull, 
7 Utah 90, 24 P. 799 (1890); Whittaker v. 
Ferguson, 16 Utah 240, 51 P. 980 (1898); 
Schettler v. Lynch, 23 Utah 305, 64 P. 955 
(1901); Culmer v. Salt Lake City, 27 Utah 252, 
75 P. 620 (1904); Brown v. Oregon Short Line 
R.R., 36 Utah 257, 102 P. 740 (1909); Morris v. 
Blunt, 49 Utah 243,161 P. 1127 (1916); William 
J. Lemp Brewing Co. v. P.J. Moran, Inc., 51 
Utah 178, 169 P. 459 (1917); Barboglio v. 
Gibson, 61 Utah 314, 213 P. 385 (1923). 
—Not necessary . 
The determination that a roadway has been 
continuously used by members of the general 
public for at least ten years is the sole require-
ment for it to become a public road; it is not 
necessary to prove the owner's intent to offer 
the road to the public. Thurman v. Byram, 626 
R2d 447 (Utah 1981). 
l b establish a dedication of a road to a public 
use, it is not necessary to prove landowner's 
intent to dedicate the road to a public use. Leo 
M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 
639 P.2d 211 (Utah 1981). 
Private rights. 
Creation of a private right in a public thor-
oughfare cannot occur; a prescriptive right is in 
conflict with the dedication of land to the use of 
the general public. Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 
910 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
"Public" defined. 
Owners of property abutting or straddling 
rural road and their personal visitors were not 
members of public generally within this provi-
sion; burden of proving real public use of that 
road continuously for ten years was not met in 
suit by subdividers who sought to establish 
that the road had become a public thorough-
fare. Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438 
P.2d 545 (1968). 
Rights granted to public. 
City still owned fee to strip, acquired under 
Tbwnsite Act (43 U.S.C. § 718 et seq., now 
repealed), after alleged dedication thereof as 
public street, so tha t only right that public 
could have acquired would be right to easement 
across strip for traveling purposes, and only 
additional right contiguous property owners 
Blight acquire would be right of ingress to and 
egress from their property. Premium Oil Co. v. 
Cedar City, 112 Utah 324, 187 P.2d 199 (1947). 
Rights of subsequent grantees. 
Where land is dedicated by owner as highway 
and is accepted by public as such, all subse-
quent grantees of abutting lands are bound by 
dedication. Schettler v. Lynch, 23 Utah 305, 64 
P. 955 (1901). 
Sufficiency of proof of dedication. 
Highway over privately owned ground will be 
deemed dedicated or abandoned to the public 
use when the public has continuously used it as 
a thoroughfare for a period of ten years. Morris 
v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127 (1916). 
For cases finding sufficient evidence to sup-
port finding of dedication to public use, see 
Sullivan v. Condas, 76 Utah 585, 290 P. 954 
(1930); Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1, 116 
P.2d 420 (1941); Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 
326 P.2d 107 (1958); Clark v. Erekson, 9 Utah 
2d 212, 341 P.2d 424 (1959). 
Mere use by public of private alley in common 
with owners of alley does not show a dedication 
thereof to public use, or vest any right in public 
to the way. Thompson v. Nelson, 2 Utah 2d 340, 
273 P.2d 720 (1954). 
Though dedication of one's land to public use 
should not be lightly regarded, where a narrow, 
private dead-end street was used by neighbor-
ing residents and the general public without 
interference for at least 25 years, and where the 
city had platted it as a public street in 1915 and 
had thereafter paved it and maintained a pub-
lic street sign at its entrance, and where plain-
tiff who owned the fee simple interest in the 
land on which the street was situated had not 
paid any taxes on the street property for 25 
years, this combination of factors was sufficient 
to justify finding tha t the street had been 
dedicated to public use. Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 
Utah 2d 140, 417 P.2d 646 (1966). 
Clear and convincing quantum and quality of 
proof is required for the establishment of a 
public thoroughfare or taking of another's prop-
erty. Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 493 
P.2d 639 (1972). 
Where the trial court found that public had 
used north-south road for 12 years and that 
during this time, the road was ten feet wide, 
and the court found tha t there was insufficient 
use of an east-west road by the public to make 
it a public road, these findings of fact, sup-
ported by substantial evidence, compelled a 
holding that the north-south road was a public 
highway ten feet wide and that no public high-
way existed on the east-west road. Western 
Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jack-
son Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987). 
Because there were material issues of fact as 
to whether people using a road were members 
of the general public or landowners in the area, 
who had either a private right or permission to 
use the road, and there were conflicting state-
ments as to public use of the road for recre-
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ational purposes, summary judgment in favor 
of the proponents of dedication was erroneous. 
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 
1097 (Utah 1995). 
Finding tha t a road was not a public thor-
oughfare was proper based on evidence that the 
road was generally used only during the deer 
hunting season and was frequently closed to 
the public at other times, and that its use 
during the hunting season was by permission of 
the owners. Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 
P.2d 806 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
T h o r o u g h f a r e " and "public thorough-
fare" dist inguished. 
Under identically worded predecessor sec-
tion, a "thoroughfare" was a place or way 
through which there is passing or travel. It 
ANALYSIS 
Abutting owners' rights. 
Bridges. 
Notice of abandonment required. 
Platted but unused streets. 
Power of city to abandon. 
Requisites for abandonment. 
Abutt ing owners ' rights. 
While public may abandon street or highway 
insofar as it affects rights of public therein, 
such abandonment, however, will not affect 
rights of abutting owner with respect to use of 
easement for ingress and egress to and from his 
premises. Hague v. Juab County Mill & Eleva-
tor Co., 37 Utah 290, 107 P. 249 (1910). 
Where property is sold with reference to a 
map or plat showing it to abut on a public 
highway, this constitutes an implied covenant 
that highway will not be obstructed or inter-
fered with by grantor. While highway by aban-
donment may pass out of jurisdiction of local 
became a "public thoroughfare" when the public 
acquired a general right of passage. Morris v 
Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127 (1916). 
Width of roadway. 
Although there Nvas some incidental evidence 
in the record regarding the width of the road in 
question, it was not error for the district court 
to refuse to determine the width of the road 
when that issue was not the focus of the litiga-
tion. Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v 
Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225 
(Utah 1995). 
Generally, the width of a public road is deter-
mined according to what is reasonable and 
necessary under all the facts and circum-
stances. Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996). 
authorities, rights of abutting owners will not 
be affected. Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah 501, 
126 P. 959 (1912). 
Bridges. 
Bridge owned by county was an essential 
part of road and could not be abandoned except 
as provided by statute. Adney v. State Rd. 
Comm'n, 67 Utah 567, 248 P. 811 (1926). 
Notice of abandonment required. 
County commissioners may not order aban-
donment of a county road unless notice thereof 
is given. Ercanbrack v. Judd, 524 P2d 595 
(Utah 1974). 
Platted but unused streets. 
Corporation was able to give good title to 
land platted for streets and alleyways but 
never used as such, since under proviso in-
former law, road not used or worked for five 
years ceased to be a highway. Mallory v.. 
Taggart, 24 Utah 2d 267, 470 P2d 254 (1970). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Highways, C.J.S. — 39A C.J.S. Highways § 15. 
Streets, and Bridges § 24 et seq. 
72-5-105. Highways once established continue until aban-
doned. 
All public highways once established shall continue to be highways until 
abandoned or vacated by order of the highway authorities having jurisdiction 
over any highway, or by other competent authority. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 90; C. 1953, ment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered 
27-12-90; renumbered by L. 1998, ch. 270, this section, which formerly appeared as § 
§ 133. 27-12-90, and made a stylistic change. 
Amendment Notes . — The 1998 amend-
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Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
State of Utah, et. al., : 
Plaintiffs '• Memorandum Decision 
vs> : Date: June 16,2004 
Randy Butler, et al., : Case Number: 000403327" 
Defendants : Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor 
This matter came before the Court for trial on June 1,2004. The case continued through 
7 days of testimony concluding with closing arguments on June 15. The Court has taken the 
matter under advisement and now renders this Memorandum Decision. 
The Plaintiffs have asked this Court to determine that a route described as the Benny 
Creek Road is a public highway under Utah Code Annotated section 72-5-104,1953 as 
amended.1 hi addition, the Plaintiffs ask the Court to exercise its equitable powers to restrain the 
Defendants from blocking the road from public use and declare a right of way along the road for 
the public, although it seems that a declaration mat the route is a public highway would render a 
further declaration of a public right of way to be superfluous. The Plaintiffs also ask for damages 
of $10.00 per day since July 29,1997 when notice was provided to the Defendants that they were 
formerly 27-12-89, renumbered in 1998. The statute has 
remained substantially unchanged since first enacted by the 
Territorial Legislature in 1886, Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. 
Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 285 P. 646 at 648 (Utah, 1929). 
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improperly blocking a public highway under Utah Code Annotated section 72-7-104 and an 
identical Utah County Ordinance (17-3-1-1). 
In a case such as this the Court is required to consider "reconstruction of historical facts 
concerning timing, nature, and the extent of public usage [Witnesses are required to dredge 
the recesses of their minds for aged memories," Kohler v. Martin. 916 P.2d 910 at 912 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996). Over 60 witnesses have testified in this trial recalling facts and circumstances from 
as early as 1927. Nearly half provided the Court with memories preceding 1960. None of the 
witnesses, in the view of this Court, attempted to mis-lead or do anything other than give an 
honest and complete recitation of what they recall. Even so, when the testimony is compared to 
pictures, maps and other testimony some statements must be given greater credibility than others. 
Public Highway 
Three factors must be established by clear and convincing evidence in order for a route to 
be deemed a dedicated highway, abandoned to the use of the public under U.C.A. section 72-5-
104: "there must be (i) continuous use, (ii) as a public thoroughfare, (iii) for a period often years. 
. . .Once the technical provisions of [the statute] have been satisfied, the road is a 'public 
highway.' The court has no discretion to ignore that fact." Campbell v. Box Elder County. 962 
P.2d 806 at 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) citing Heber Citv Corp. v. Simpson. 942 P.2d 307 at 310 
(Utah, 1997). There is no requirement of proof of the owner's intent to offer the road to the 
public. Bertagnole v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211 at 213 (Utah, 1981); see also Draper 
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City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 at 1099 (Utah, 1995) and Thurman v. Bvram. 626 P.2d 
445 at 449 (Utah 1981). 
Continuous Use 
Continuous use is established where the public has "made a continuous and uninterrupted 
use of the road as often as they found it convenient or necessary," Campbell 962 P.2d at 809. 
The "use may be continuous though not constant,... provided it occurred as often as the 
claimant had occasion to chose to pass. Mere intermission is not interruption." Id at 809 (citing 
Richards v. Pines Ranch. Inc.. 559 P.2d 948 (Utah 1977). 
In this case the evidence was that a route of travel from U.S. Highway 89 near the 
"Birdseye Church" has extended west toward the Uintah National Forest since before the 
memory of any witness. An ariel photograph taken in 1949 clearly shows the road extending 
from the highway into the vicinity of the national forest. Madge Truman and Ginnie Johnson 
both testified that their family owned the property now owned by Defendant Randy Butler 
(herinafter "Gardner Property") from 1927 until 1963 and that they lived on the property along 
the road from 1925 or 1933 (depending upon which sister is considered) until 1949. During that 
time the road was traveled often and no attempts were made by the family to restrict or deny 
access to the road to any members of the public. One witness for the Defendants, Lloyd Jackson, 
testified that he trailed sheep across the Gardner property between 1947 and 1955. He also 
hunted in the area every year until 1965. He testified that his father "made arrangements" with 
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Mr. Gardner to move the sheep across the property on the way to the forest service property. The 
Defendant insists that this travel was, therefore, by permission. However, the witness did not 
participate in the discussion and both parties to the actual arrangements are deceased. It was 
apparent that the Gardners had cattle on their property. Care needed to be taken to not allow the 
sheep to get into the cattle-the herds needed to be kept apart. The conversations and 
arrangements were just as likely an effort to work out the details of the operation as to gain 
permission to travel a road. Contrasted with that testimony are the statements by Duane Newitt, 
Ron Davis, Reneae Swenson, Glen Roberts, Norris Dalton, Youd Barney, Hugh Tangren, Don 
Daley, Craig Ingram, and Glen Thatcher. All of these witnesses personally used the road for 
recreation including hunting, fishing, camping and sightseeing in the 1940's and 50's. None 
encountered locked gates or sought permission. None were ever prevented from traveling the 
road. Several, including Norris Dalton and Hugh Tangren, drove vehicles well into forest service 
property. 
There was testimony that travel was impacted by the weather. Springs or bogs in the 
road were worse in wetter times of the year and occasionally restricted travel by vehicle. Winter 
snow was not plowed off of this mountain road. Nevertheless, the evidence is clear and 
convincing that for at least 10 years prior to 1958 the road was open and traveled by the public as 
often as necessary or convenient, interrupted only by naturally occurring conditions such as 
groundwater (spring water) in wet years and snow in the winter. 
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Mr. Butler and his parents (J. Lee Butler and Diane Butler) recalled family hunting trips 
between 1958 and 1962 when family members accompanied the family patriarch, Barney Newitt 
(Diane Butler's father, Randy Butler's grandfather) to a location in Sanpete County to obtain a 
key before traveling up the road to camp just below the bog on property now owned by 
Defendants Blaine and Linda Evans. Randy Butler has a particularly vivid memory from 
approximately 1962 when, at age 7, he saw his grandfather get out of the truck to unlock a gate 
and spotted a buck which he shot before opening the gate to allow continued travel on the road. 
Contrasted against this vivid and believable recollection, however, is other important evidence. 
Only the Poulson family has been identified as property owners who lived in Sanpete County. 
Barney Newitt and Grandmother Poulsen, to whom he would have spoken in 1958 to 1962 about 
a key are both deceased. Steve Poulson testified that to his knowledge the only locked gate on 
the Poulson property during that time was on a side road south off the Benny Creek road toward 
an old bunkhouse. Duane Newitt, the brother of Diane Butler, testified that he camped and 
hunted with the family during those years and does not recall any locked gates. Nineteen other 
witnesses testified that they traveled the road for a variety of purposes during that time and never 
encountered any locked gates. None of the other witnesses ever felt it necessary to obtain 
permission from property owners to travel the road. 
Other witnesses testified for the Defendants that there were locked gates on the road. 
Virgil Neeves testified that between 1958 and 1980 there was a locked gate near the Gardner 
Page 5 of 18 
001469 
home (the last home traveling west toward the forest service property, now occupied by 
Defendant Randy Butler) which was locked most of the time. He specifically recalled a "cock 
fight"2 up the road in 1972 when only people who were supposed to participate were given keys 
to the gate. A cock fight, of course, is an illegal activity and the one time use of the gate to 
discourage discovery or participation by persons not known to the participants can hardly be 
considered to be a termination of general public access. Mr. Neeves' other access to the area was 
usually across cojuntry from the property he worked to the north (the Dixon Ranch) to work on 
water diversion works along Bennie Creek. He saw people stuck on the road and recalls a cable 
across the road to stop cars. His memories are simply confused and inconsistent with all of the 
other testimony about obstructions on the road in question. There is evidence of a cable across a 
side road belonging to the Poulson family. 
Mike Condley testified that he lived in the area from 1970 until 1979. Although he does 
not recall any locks after 1979, he firmly recalled a locked gate near the Gardner (Butler) home. 
However, no other witness corroborates this point and descriptions of locked gates by the Butler 
2
"Cockfights" are illegal contests between roosters bred and 
trained to fight typically involving wagering and serious threat 
of injury to the animals. Presently outlawed by U.C.A. section 
76-9-301(1) (e), the practice has been illegal in this State since 
at least 1898. The Revised Statutes of the State of Utah, 
January 1, 1898 section 4454 provided that "any person who shall 
keep or use any . . . fowl, or bird, for the purpose of fighting 
. . . and any person who shall be a party to or be present as a 
spectator at any such fighting . . . shall be adjudged guilty of 
a misdemeanor." 
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family, Defendant Blaine Evans and others put the locked gates farther west, near the present 
cattle guard between the Butler home and forest service property. 
Finally Elizabeth Condley testified that between 1967 and 1977 the gates were never 
locked in the summer but that they were locked late in every fall. However, her testimony was 
that she traveled the road on horseback during the summer. There was nothing given to explain 
how she could have known that the gate was locked in the fall. 
The heaviest use of the property was clearly for hunting deer and elk in the fall season. 
Several dozen witness testified that they personally hunted the area between 1958 and 1980 and 
never encountered locked gates or were otherwise prevented from using the road. Division of 
Wildlife Resources officers Gurley and Briggs both patrolled the area to check hunters during 
that period. Dale Gurley, in particular, patrolled between 1968 and 1991 sometimes observing as 
many as 25 or 30 hunters in the forest service area who had traveled up the Benny Creek road to 
hunt. Officer Gurley never encoimtered locked gates and never needed permission to access the 
area to check on hunters and fishermen. Kent Comaby, Forest Service supervisor, routinely 
traveled the road during the 60's and 70's. Entrance to the forest service during that time was 
marked by signs. 
Shirlene Otteson testified that her family purchased the Gardner property in 1964 and 
owned it until 1981. During that time she was regularly on the property with her husband and 
children. The road was considered and treated by her family as a public road during that time. 
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No attempt was made to close the road during that time. There was testimony that one defense 
witness, John Mendenhall, was told by Ms. Otteson's father, Mr. Roach, to stop hunting and 
leave the property. However he testified that he was a teenager with three other teenagers and no 
adult. He was hunting well off the road on the Roach (Gardner/now Butler) property. Ordering 
teenagers to leave in such a circumstance hardly equates with restricting travel on the road. 
There was testimony that the road is periodically used to deliver irrigation water to 
property along the road and that when that occurs, the road becomes impassable. However, 
neither the Gardner family nor the Otteson (Roach) families used that method of irrigation, 
covering a period from 1925 to 1981. 
There was substantial testimony about signs along the road. The Defendants have 
insisted that there were many signs, perpendicular to the road, coupled with posts painted yellow 
and orange clearly designating the area as private property. Most of Plaintiffs' witnesses testified 
that they saw the signs but considered them warning against leaving the road but not a warning 
against traveling on the road. The evidence was that the signs were placed on various locations 
along the edge of the road west of the Gardner home and, in particular, around a wire gate in the 
vicinity of a present cattle guard. 
Utah Code Annotated section 23-20-14 provides a mechanism for private property 
owners to restrict hunter access to their property by posting: 
"Properly posted" means that "No Trespassing" signs or a minimum of 100 square 
inches of bright yellow, bright orange, or flourescent paint are displayed at all 
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corners, fishing streams crossing property lines, roads, gates, and rights-of-way 
entering the land. If metal fence posts are used, the entire exterior side must be 
painted." 
The plain and obvious intent of the statute is to require physical notation or warning at the 
entrance or on the edge of property. Members of the public encountering such signs would have 
to conclude, based upon the statute, that they were at a property line or on the edge of private 
property, meaning that where they are standing is not restricted. Signs and painted posts along a 
fence running parallel to a road, regardless of the physical juxtaposition of the sign, more clearly 
indicate the fence as a boundary than prohibiting travel along the road from which the signs can 
be seen. The signs and painted posts in this case clearly did what the plaintiffs' witnesses 
assumed-they prohibited travel off of the road, not on the road. 
There was testimony regarding four gates on the Benny Creek road between U.S. 
Highway 89 and the Uintah National Forest. Traveling west from the highway, the first gate 
location is near the Gardner home (presently the Randy and Donna Butler home). All but one 
witness described the versions of this gate prior to 1996 as a drift wire gate that was never 
locked. All testified and assumed it was used to assist in livestock operations and not to restrict 
general travel on the road. 
The second gate to the west was within 100 yards of a present cattle gate. Also a wire 
gate, most witnesses did not recall any locks and that the gate was only occasionally closed. 
These witnesses assumed that, again, the gate was for use with livestock operations and not 
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intended to restrict travel on the road. There was also testimony, however, that this gate was 
locked on occasion after 1980 and the implication was that this was the gate unlocked by Barney 
Newitt in the late 50's and early 60's. Remnants of the gate still exist, including a weathered 
piece of plywood which was brought into court. This evidence is simply too skimpy and too 
removed to conclude that the fence was locked and signed to disrupt public travel particularly in 
the face of all the witness who regularly traveled the road and recalled no locks or road 
restrictions. 
There was testimony of a "white gate" constructed of lumber and located near an ancient 
bridge spanning one of the ditches or streams crossing the road. One witness testified that the 
gate had been locked on one occasion and one exhibit includes a picture of a yellow pole 
described as the remnants of the bridge. However, again, this minimal evidence is overwhelmed 
by the substantial testimony of persons who used and drove the road on all seasons between 1925 
and 1980 without encountering any locked gate. 
The fourth gate is at the entrance to the forest service property. There has been a sign 
indicating the entrance to the forest service for at least 35 years and the forest service property 
has clearly been fenced in the memory of all witnesses. A sign, still on the gate, asks users to 
"please close the gate."3 The obstruction was obviously intended to restrict the travel of cattle 
3What was formerly a wire livestock gate has been replaced 
with a cattle guard. A metal gate nearby allows horses and 
livestock to move through the fence when required. The sign is 
presently on the metal gate. 
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and sheep, not people. 
It is established, by clear and convincing evidence that the road was in continuous use by 
the public. 
Public Thoroughfare 
The term "thoroughfare" is not defined in any Utah statute. Competent legal authority 
defines the term as "a street or way opening at both ends into another street or public highway, so 
that one can go through and get out of it without returning. It differs from a cul de sac, which is 
open only at one end.'* The Utah Supreme Court has stated that: 
[w]hile it is difficult to fix a standard by which the measure what is a public use 
or a pubhc thoroughfare, it can be said here that the road was used by many and 
different persons for a variety of purposes; that it was open to all who desired to 
use it; that the use made of it was as general and extensive as the situation and 
surroundings would permit, had the road been formally laid out as a public 
highway by public authority." 
Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnos. 75 Utah 384,285 P. 646 at 648 (Utah 1929). 
The Court has also stated that a "'thoroughfare' is a place or way through which there is 
passing or travel. It becomes a 'public thoroughfare' when the public have a general right of 
passage." Gillmor v. Carter, 15 U.2d 280,391 P.2d 426 at 428 (Utah 1964). 
In another case evidence that the road was generally impassable, that the road failed to 
connect or lead to public property and that there had been only minimal maintenance were 
^ouvier's Law Dictionary, Banks-Baldwin Law Publishing 
Company, Cleveland: 1946. 
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reasons to overturn a determination by summary judgment that a proposed road was a highway 
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo. 888 P.2d 1097 at 1100-1101 (Utah 1995). Of course the 
Draper City case did not determine that the road known as the "Lower Comer Canyon Road" 
could not be determined to be a public highway in the face of such evidence, only that the issue 
could not be resolved via summary judgment. This case is in a substantially different posture. 
This Court concludes, by clear and convincing evidence, the following facts about the 
Benny Creek road. The road or path connects U.S. Highway 89 and the Uintah National Forest. 
Paths and trails from the top or terminus of the road travel over the moimtain and connect to the 
Nebo Loop Road. During certain seasons and at certain times between 1925 and 1980 there were 
springs or ditches which created bogs making travel through or around difficult or impossible. 
Nevertheless, there was regular maintenance performed on the road by Utah County, the United 
States Forest Service and landowners during that time. The road was graded as needed or 
following significant storms during the 1950's. The County has had a contract with the forest 
service requiring them to maintain the road from 1974 through the present time. There was no 
evidence that the County has not honored that contract. One witness for the Defense testified 
that he operated a grader for the County and only graded from the church to the Gardner home 
for several years. Others, however, testified that they graded the road from the termination of 
oiled road in Birdseye to the forest service property at least twice per year during the decades of 
the 60fs and 70's. The testimony established a wide variety of uses including travel to the forest 
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service and adjoining private property for fishing, deer hunting, elk hunting, cougar hunting 
(during the winter), hiking, family outings, general sightseeing, labor on irrigation headwaters, 
movement of cattle and sheep, law enforcement related to wildlife regulations, and maintenance 
of forest trails and signs by forest service employees. Vehicles, horses, trailers, hikers, bikes and 
motorcycles were all driven at various times the entire length of the road ending on forest service 
property. 
The Court concludes that the road was a public thoroughfare before 1980. 
10 years 
The statute specifies a 10 year period. This Court finds, by clear and convincing evidence 
that even if it is concluded (which this Court does not) that the road was gated and locked in the 
late 50fs and early 60's as described by the Butlers, the road was used as necessary and 
convenient by the public for more than 10 years before that time and, again, 10 years after that 
time. 
Reasonable and Necessary Width 
Having determined that the Benny Creek road was a public highway before 1980 by clear 
and convincing evidence, this Court must also determine the reasonable and necessary width of 
the highway, Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910 at 914 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), U.C.A. Section 72-5-
104(3). The only testimony on this point was that of Clyde Naylor, a qualified engineer and 
longtime director of public works for Utah County. Mr. Naylor testified that a width of 20 feet 
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plus a three foot shoulder on each side for a total width of 26 feet was reasonably necessary for 
anticipated travel. There being no evidence to the contrary the Court finds that the width of the 
roadway in this case should be 26 feet, including a 3 foot shoulder on each side.5 
Injunction 
As noted above, the issuance of an injunction may be mooted by the determination that 
the road is a public highway. Nevertheless, it is the order of this Court that the Defendants 
refrain from blocking, locking or otherwise interfering with public access to the Benny Creek 
road. It should be noted that the determination expressed in this decision takes into account the 
occasional use of the road for transportation of irrigation water. While there was little or no 
evidence that the road was actually used in lieu of an irrigation pipe or ditch before 1980, the 
testimony was not controverted that with the present, improved condition of the road, the 
occasional presence of irrigation water on the road will not substantially interfere with public use 
5The Court notes that a legal description of the centerline 
of the road generated from a survey of the road itself was 
introduced into evidence. The description was challenged by 
counsel for the Defendants since it appears to lie in a different 
township or range than the legal description of the Defendants' 
properties. Testimony was also presented that indicated that 
several years ago the adjoining property owners agreed to 
establish their respective boundaries as the center of the 
roadway and confirmed that agreement by recorded boundary line 
agreement. No expert testimony was presented to assist this 
Court to determine if there is a conflict in the two positions or 
how such a conflict, if it exists, should be resolved. The Court 
merely determines, today, that the road as it presently exists is 
a public highway, 20 feet wide with a three foot shoulder on each 
side. 
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of the road. 
Fines 
U.C.A. section 72-7-104 provides that any person who installs, places or maintains a 
structure within the right-of-way of a highway must remove the structure within ten days of 
notice. Upon failure to remove the structure "[a] highway authority may recover:... (b) $10 for 
each day the installation remained within the right-of-way after notice was complete." Notice to 
Mr. and Mrs. Butler was completed on July 29,1997. Calculated from 10 days after service to 
the date of this decision, 2,561 days have passed. 
Nevertheless, several factors must also be considered. There was testimony that a locked 
gate was constructed in 1996 by Mr. Butler. There was also substantial testimony that many 
people were unable to travel the road after that time without gaining permission or using a key 
provided by Mr. and Mrs. Butler. However, one exhibit shows a gate created by the County 
which allowed travel past the Butler gate, although admonishing travelers to close the gate and 
stay on the road until arriving at the forest service. As noted above there have historically been 
gates across the road for purposes unrelated to obstruction of traffic. An unlocked gate is 
consistent with this pattern and would not be considered to violate the right-of-way declared 
today. Consequently, for some of the time since construction of the metal Butler gate the road 
has been obstructed and for some of the time it has not. No evidence was presented to clarify 
how many of the intervening 2,561 days were days when the road was obstructed and how many 
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were not. The Plaintiffs, as the moving party in seeking to obtain the penalty, had the burden of 
providing specific evidence of the number of days the Defendants have been in violation. Merely 
showing initial service and testimony that persons were stopped from time to time during the last 
6 or 7 years does not meet that burden. Inasmuch as the Court cannot determine with reasonable 
precision the number of days during which a violation of the State statute and County ordinances 
existed no penalty can be imposed. 
Costs of Court 
The Plaintiffs are, however, as the prevailing party entitled to recover reasonable costs of 
court to be established by affidavit. 
Conclusion 
In this decision the Court has avoided reference to facts and circumstances after 1980. 
The Court is convinced by what it considers to be clear and convincing evidence that a public 
highway was established on the Benny Creek Road decades before the Butler, Evans or even 
Condley families ever came into possession of the property abutting the road. As a member of 
the public of this county, state and nation this Court is ashamed that these Defendants have had 
to suffer abuse at the hands of the general public. Their cattle have been stolen and killed. Their 
property has been littered. Their lives have been threatened. The distance from "the valley" 
gives a certain solitude and quiet peace equally attractive to the people who have made Birdseye 
their home, people who wish to enjoy the natural beauty as visitors and people who wish to 
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escape rules of behavior. Bullet holes in signs and beer cans and used syringes littering the 
landscape are not proud symbols of Utah and America. That said, it is also clear that other good 
and responsible people have used and cherished the area. It was obviously a particularly special 
place for the Newitt family. Grandchildren have caught their first fish in Benny Creek and 
dozens and dozens of hunters have relished a yearly visit to Deer Hollow-which was not 
accidentally named. 
It is the business of this Court, sitting in equity, to resolve the needs and desires of 
competing interests. The law properly demands great deference to private ownership and 
property rights. In this case, however, the evidence is clear and convincing that the road in 
question has been a public thoroughfare connecting a national forest and recreation area to a 
national highway for decades and generations. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff is directed to prepare findings of fact, conclusions of law and an 
order consistent with this decision. 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY and STATE OF UTAH, 
by and through its DEPARTMENT OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES, DIVISION ; 
OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES, ; 
Plaintiffs, ] 
v.
 t 
RANDY BUTLER; DONNA BUTLER, ; 
etal, ) 
Defendants. ' 
) Case No. 000403372 
1 Judge James R. Taylor 
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
COME NOW Defendants Randy Butler, Donna Butler, and Blaine Evans, by and 
ORIGINAL 
•«> / ' 
"*' P. B'25 
nnusfi 
through counsel, Mark E. Arnold and Scott L Wiggins, of and for Arnold & Wiggins, 
P.C., and submit the following objection to Plaintiffs' proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law together with a request for oral argument on the on the following 
objections. 
Defendants respectfully object to the following proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law for the following reasons: 
1. Finding no. 6 presumes evidence not founded on evidence in that it is based 
upon testimony for which no witness has memory. 
2. Finding no. 8 is not supported by the evidence in that both witnesses were 
unable to testify as to whether or not the individuals observed using the road were 
members of the public or not and the finding should be limited to the fact that each 
witness was unaware of any attempts to restrict or deny access and not that there were 
"no" attempts or restrictions. 
3. Finding no. 9 is not supported by the evidence in that no testimony was 
offered to the fact that any cattle located on the Gardner property was owned by the 
Gardners. 
4. Finding no. 10 is not supported by the evidence in that there was no 
testimony that several witnesses "drove vehicles well into the forest service property" 
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because no testimony was offered that the road in fact extended up to and well into the 
service property, and that several people had in fact traveled it, including the individuals 
so named in the finding. 
5. Finding no. 11 is not supported by the evidence in that no testimony was 
offered as to how frequently the bog restricted traffic. The testimony certainly was not 
that the traffic was "occasionally restricted." Further, there was no testimony to support 
the finding that the road was continuously passible by foot, horseback, or horse drawn 
wagon and that the bog restricted only vehicular traffic. 
6. Finding no. 17 is not supported by the evidence in that Mr. Mendenhall's 
testimony was such that he said that he considered the road as part of Mr. Roach's pasture 
and he understood that when he was kicked off the property, the property included the 
road as well. 
7. Finding no. 18 is not supported by the evidence in that no testimony was 
offered as to the Gardner or Otteson (Roach) irrigation practices or the method they used 
to transport water to their fields or to other down-stream users of the irrigation water. 
8. Finding no. 19 is not supported by the evidence in that no testimony was 
offered as to their consideration of State law when deciding whether or not the signs 
pertained to the road and the Defendants' fields or just the fields stretching along the 
3 
0 1 ! 
road. 
9. Finding no. 22 is not supported by the evidence in that persons "who used 
and drove" the Road did so in all seasons between 1925 and 1980. 
10. Finding no. 25 is not supported by the evidence in that the testimony did not 
establish that the Forest Service ever maintained the road, and that the road was regularly 
maintained between the years of 1925 and 1980. Further, the County did not have a 
contract with the Forest Service to maintain the road from 1974 through the present, and 
the County never introduced any evidence of an employee who graded the road prior to 
thel980'sand90's. 
11. Finding no. 29 is not supported by the evidence in that the finding and the 
written decision of the Court ignores the evidence presented that the road was sufficiently 
narrow that cars could not turn around and on occasion they had to back down in order to 
get back to U.S. Highway 89. 
12. Finding no. 32 is not supported by the evidence in that the Court never 
ruled that the County obtained a "right-of-way" but instead the Court found pursuant to 
State statute that a road was abandoned to public use by the Defendants and their 
predecessors in interest. 
13. Finding no. 33 is not supported by the evidence in that no testimony was 
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offered establishing "decades and generations." 
14. Conclusion of Law no 7 appears to be a finding of fact rather than a 
conclusion of law and in that respect is not supported by the evidence that the property 
was abandoned as a public road 20 feet in width with a 3-foot shoulder on each side. 
15. Conclusions of Law 8 and 9 are findings of fact, and Defendants object for 
the same reasons stated in paragraph number 11, above. 
16. Defendants object to *fl of the proposed order insofar as it does not state an 
amount certain. 
DATED this 9th day of August, 2004. 
ARNOLD & WIGGINS^P^ 
Mark E. Arnold 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, MARK E. ARNOLD, hereby certify that I personally caused to be forwarded by 
facsimile and First-Class Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
to the following on this 9th day of August, 2004: 
Mr. Martin B. Bushman 
Assistant Attorney General 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
1594 West North Temple, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
Facsimile No. (801) 538-7440 
A ttorneys for State of Utah 
Mark E. Arnold 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY and STATE OF UTAH, by 
and through its DEPARTMENT OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES, DIVISION OF 
WILDLIFE RESOURCES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RANDY BUTLER, DONNA BUTLER, 
MARGARET CONDLEY, MICHAEL E. 
CONDLEY, ELIZABETH CONDLEY, 
BLAINE EVANS, LINDA EVANS and JOHN 
DOES 1 through 15 
Defendants. 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AN 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT; 
OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR 
ORAL ARGUMENT, OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, REQUEST FOR 
EXPEDITED HEARING; REQUEST 
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Civil No. 000403372 
Division No. VII 
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COME NOW Plaintiffs Utah County and State of Utah, by and through its Department of 
Natural Resources, Division of Wildlife Resources (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
"Plaintiffs"), by and through counsel undersigned, and hereby respectfully submits this Response 
to Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Request for Oral 
Argument; Objection to Request for Oral Argument, or in the Alternative, Request for Expedited 
Hearing; Request for Attorneys' Fees. 
ARGUMENT 
The Court after seven days of trial followed by a morning of closing arguments issued a 
thorough Memorandum Decision on June 16, 2004. Defendants' Objection is in all actuality an 
objection to the Court's Memorandum Decision because Plaintiffs' proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order is nearly verbatim of the Memorandum Decision. Any proposed 
changes are minor and are not substantive in nature. 
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants' Objection is merely a ruse to further delay the 
opening of the gate across the Bennie Creek Road. As the hunting seasons approach,1 the public 
will continue to experience irreparable harm, even though the Court has ruled that the public has 
an easement across the Bennie Creek Road. 
*The archery deer hunt commences on August 21, 2004. The archery elk hunt 
commences on August 26,2004. The muzzleloader deer hunt commences on September 29, 
2004. The rifle elk hunt commences on October 9, 2004. The rifle deer hunt commences on 
October 23, 2004. The muzzleloader elk hunt commences on November 6, 2004. 
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A. Plaintiffs9 Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order are 
Nearly Verbatim of the Memorandum Decision Dated June 16, 2004. 
Plaintiffs respond to each of the objections posed by Defendants as follows: 
Proposed Finding of Fact No. 6 of which Defendants' object is nearly verbatim to a 
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 6 states as 
follows: 
That the Road follows a route of travel from U.S. Highway 89 near 
the "Birdseye Church" and has extended west toward the Uinta 
National Forest since before the memory of any witness. 
The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows: 
In this case the evidence was that a route of travel from U.S. 
Highway 89 near the "Birdseye Church" has extended west toward 
the Uintah National Forest since before the memory of any witness. 
See Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 2004, page 3, paragraph 2, sentence 1. 
Proposed Finding of Fact No. 8 of which Defendants' object is nearly verbatim to a 
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 8 states as 
follows: 
That Madge Truman and Ginnie Johnson both testified that their family 
owned the property now owned by Defendants Randy Butler and Donna 
Butler (hereinafter referred to as "Gardner Property") from 1927 until 
1963 and that they lived on the property along the Road from 1925 or 
1933 (depending upon which sister is considered) until 1949. During that 
time the Road was traveled by the public often and no attempts were made 
by the family to restrict or deny access to the Road to any members of the 
public. 
The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows: 
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Madge Truman and Ginnie Johnson both testified that their family 
owned the property now owned by Defendant Randy Butler 
(herinafter "Gardner Property") from 1927 until 1963 and that they 
lived on the property along the road from 1925 or 1933 (depending 
upon which sister is considered) until 1949. During that time the 
road was traveled often and no attempts were made by the family 
to restrict or deny access to the road to any members of the public. 
See Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 2004, page 3, paragraph 2, sentence 3. 
3. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 9 of which Defendants' object is nearly verbatim to a 
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 9 states as 
follows: 
That Loyd Jackson, a defense witness, testified that he trailed 
sheep across the Gardner property between 1947 and 1955. He 
also hunted in the area every year until 1965. He testified that his 
father "made arrangements" with Mr. Gardner to move sheep 
across the Gardner's property on the way to the forest service 
property. Defendants insist that this travel was, therefore, by 
permission. However, Mr. Jackson did not participate in the 
discussions and both parties to the actual arrangements are 
deceased. It was apparent that the Gardners had cattle on their 
property. Care needed to be taken to not allow the sheep to get into 
the cattle, as the herds needed to be kept apart. The conversations 
and arrangements were just as likely an effort to work out the 
details of the operation as to gain permission to travel the Road. 
The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows: 
. . . Loyd Jackson, testified that he trailed sheep across the Gardner 
property between 1947 and 1955. He also hunted in the area every 
year until 1965. He testified that his father "made arrangements" 
with Mr. Gardner to move sheep across the property on the way to 
the forest service property. The Defendant insists that this travel 
was, therefore, by permission. However, the witness did not 
participate in the discussion and both parties to the actual 
arrangements are deceased. It was apparent that the Gardners had 
cattle on their property. Care needed to be taken to not allow the 
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sheep to get into the cattle-the herds needed to be kept apart. The 
conversations and arrangements were just as likely an effort to 
work out the details of the operation as to gain permission to travel 
a road. 
See Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 2004, page 3, paragraph 2, sentence 5. 
4. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 10 of which Defendants' object is nearly verbatim to a 
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 10 states as 
follows: 
That Duane Newitt, Ron Davis, Renae Swenson, Glen Roberts, 
Norris Dalton, Youd Barney, Hugh Tangren, Don Daley, Craig 
Ingram, and Glen Thatcher, all personally used the Road for 
recreation including hunting, fishing, camping, and sightseeing in 
the 1940's and 50's. None of them encountered locked gates on the 
Road or sought permission to use the Road. None of them were 
ever prevented from traveling the Road. Several, including Norris 
Dalton and Hugh Tangren, drove vehicles well into forest service 
property. 
The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows: 
. . . Duane Newitt, Ron Davis, Reneae Swenson, Glen Roberts, 
Norris Dalton, Youd Barney, Hugh Tangren, Don Daley, Craig 
Ingram, and Glen Thatcher. All of these witnesses personally used 
the road for recreation including hunting, fishing, camping, and 
sightseeing in the 1940's and 50's. None encountered locked gates 
or sought permission. None were ever prevented from traveling 
the road. Several, including Norris Dalton and Hugh Tangren, 
drove vehicles well into forest service property. 
See Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 2004, page 4, paragraph 1, sentence 5. 
5. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 11 of which Defendants' object is nearly verbatim to a 
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 11 states as 
follows: 
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That travel on the Road was impacted by the weather. Springs or 
bogs in the Road were worse in the wetter times of the year and 
occasionally restricted travel by vehicle, but not by foot, 
horseback, or horse drawn wagon. Winter snow was not plowed 
off the Road. Nevertheless, the evidence is clear and convincing 
that for at least 10 years prior to 1958 the road was open and 
traveled by the public as often as necessary or convenient, 
interrupted vehicular travel only by naturally occurring conditions 
such as groundwater (spring water) in wet years and snow in the 
winter. The springs and bogs in the Road were passable on foot, 
horseback or by wagon even when vehicle access was restricted. 
The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows: 
. . . that travel was impacted by the weather. Springs or bogs in the 
road were worse in the wetter times of the year and occasionally 
restricted travel by vehicle. Winter snow was not plowed off this 
mountain road. Nevertheless, the evidence is clear and convincing 
that for at least 10 years prior to 1958 the road was open and 
traveled by the public as often as necessary or convenient, 
interrupted only by naturally occurring conditions such as 
groundwater (spring water) in wet years and snow in the winter. 
Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 2004, page 4, paragraph 2, sentence 1. 
6. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 17 of which Defendants' object is nearly verbatim to a 
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 17 states as 
follows: 
That Shirlene Otteson, a Plaintiffs witness, testified that her family 
purchased the Gardner property in 1964 and owned it until 1981. 
During that time she was regularly on the property with her 
husband and children. The Road was considered and treated by her 
family as a public road during that time. No attempt was made to 
close the Road during that time. There was testimony that one 
defense witness, John Mendenhall, was told by Mrs. Otteson's 
father, Mr. Roach, to stop hunting and leave his property. 
However, Mr. Mendenhall testified that he was a teenager with 
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three other teenagers and no adult. Mr. Mendenhall was hunting 
well off the Road on the Roach (Gardner/now Butler) property. 
Ordering teenagers to leave in such a circumstance hardly equates 
with restricting travel on the Road. 
The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows: 
Shirlene Otteson testified that her family purchased the Gardner 
property in 1964 and owned it until 1981. During that time she 
was regularly on the property with her husband and children. The 
road was considered and treated by her family as a public road 
during that time. No attempt was made to close th road during that 
time. There was testimony that one defense witness, John 
Mendenhall, was told by Ms. Otteson's father, Mr. Roach, to stop 
hunting and leave his property. However he testified that he was a 
teenager with three other teenagers and no adult. He was hunting 
well off the road on the Roach (Garnder/now Butler) property. 
Ordering teenagers to leave in such a circumstance hardly equates 
with restricting travel on the road. 
See Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 2004, page 7, paragraph 3, sentence 1. 
7. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 18 of which Defendants' object is nearly verbatim to a 
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 18 states as 
follows: 
That there was testimony that the Road is periodically used to 
deliver irrigation water to property along the Road and that when 
that occurs, the Road becomes impassable. However, neither the 
Gardner family nor the Otteson (Roach) families used that method 
of irrigation, covering a period from 1925-1981. A clear and 
convincing majority of witnesses further traveled the Road 
unrestricted by irrigation practices. 
The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows: 
There was testimony that the road is periodically used to deliver 
irrigation water to property along the road and that when that 
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occurs, the road becomes impassable. However, neither the 
Gardner family nor the Otteson (Roach) families used that method 
of irrigation, covering a period from 1925-1981. 
See Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 2004, page 8, paragraph 2, sentence 1. 
8. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 19 of which Defendants' object is nearly verbatim to a 
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 19 states as 
follows: 
That there was substantial testimony about signs along the Road. 
The Defendants have insisted that there were many signs, 
perpendicular to the Road, coupled with posts painted yellow and 
orange clearly designating the area as private property. Most of 
Plaintiffs' witnesses testified that they saw the signs but considered 
them warning against leaving the Road but not a warning against 
traveling on the Road. The evidence was that the signs were 
placed on various locations along the edge of the Road west of the 
Gardner home to the forest boundary and, in particular, around a 
wire gate in the vicinity of a present cattle guard. Members of the 
public encountering signs posting property as provided by Utah 
Code Ann. §23-20-14 would have to conclude, based upon Utah 
Code Ann. § 23-20-14, that they were at a property line or on the 
edge of private property, meaning that where they are standing is 
not restricted. Signs and painted posts along a fence running 
parallel to a road, regardless of the physical juxtaposition of the 
sign, more clearly indicate the fence as a boundary than prohibiting 
travel along the road from which the signs can be seen. The signs 
and painted posts in this case clearly did what the Plaintiffs' 
witnesses assumed, they prohibited travel off of the Road, not on 
the Road. There was no testimony that any signs stated "Road 
Closed." 
The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows: 
There was substantial testimony about signs along the road. The 
Defendants have insisted that there were many signs, perpendicular 
to the road, coupled with posts painted yellow and orange clearly 
designating the area as private property. Most of Plaintiffs' 
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witnesses testified that they saw the signs but considered them 
warning against leaving the road but not a warning against 
traveling on the road. The evidence was that the signs were placed 
on various locations along the edge of the road west of the Garnder 
home and, in particular, around a wire gate in the vicinity of a 
present cattle guard. 
. . . Members of the public encountering such signs would have to 
conclude, based upon the statute, that they were at a property line 
or on the edge of private property, meaning that where they are 
standing is not restricted. Signs and painted posts along a fence 
running parallel to a road, regardless of the physical juxtaposition 
of the sign, more clearly indicate the fence as a boundary then 
prohibiting travel along the road from which the signs can be seen. 
The signs and painted posts in this case clearly did what the 
plaintiffs' witnesses assumed-they prohibited travel off of the road, 
not on the road. 
See Memorandum Decision date June 16, 2004, page 8, paragraph 3, sentence 1, page 9, 
paragraph 1, sentence 2. 
9. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 22 of which Defendants' object is nearly verbatim to a 
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 22 states as 
follows: 
That there was testimony of a "white gate" constructed of lumber 
and located near an ancient bridge spanning one of the ditches or 
streams crossing the Road. One witness testified that the gate had 
been locked on one occasion and one exhibit includes a picture of a 
yellow pole described as the remnants of a bridge. However, 
again, this minimal evidence is overwhelmed by the substantial 
testimony of persons who used and drove the Road in all seasons 
between 1925 and 1980 without encountering any locked gate. 
The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows: 
There was testimony of a "white gate" constructed of lumber and 
located near an ancient bridge spanning one of the ditches or 
streams crossing the road. One witness testified that the gate had 
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been locked on one occasion and one exhibit includes a picture of a 
yellow pole described as the remnants of abridge. However, 
again, this minimal evidence is overwhelmed by the substantial 
testimony of persons who used and drove the road on all seasons 
between 1925 and 1980 without encountering any locked gate. 
See Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 2004, page 10, paragraph 2, sentence 
10. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 25 of which Defendants' object is nearly verbatim to a 
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 25 states as 
follows: 
That during certain seasons and at certain times between 1925 and 
1980 there were springs or ditches which created bogs at times 
making vehicular or wagon travel through or around the bogs 
difficult or impossible. Nevertheless, travel by foot or horse was 
not restricted and there was regular maintenance performed on the 
Road by Utah County, the United States Forest Service and 
landowners during that time. The Road was graded as needed or 
following significant storms during the 1950's. The County has 
had a contract with the forest service requiring them to maintain 
the Road from 1974 through the present time. There was no 
evidence that the County has not honored that contract. One 
witness for the Defense testified that he operated a grader for the 
County and only graded from the church to the Gardner home for 
several years. Others, however, testified that they graded the Road 
from the termination of oiled road in Birdseye to the forest service 
property at least twice per year during the decades of the 60fs and 
70's. 
The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows: 
During certain seasons and at certain times between 1925 and 1980 
there were springs or ditches which created bogs making travel 
through or around difficult or impossible. Nevertheless, there was 
regular maintenance performed on the road by Utah County, the 
United States Forest Service and landowners during that time. The 
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road was graded as needed or following significant storms during 
the 1950's. The County has had a contract with the forest service 
requiring them to maintain the road from 1974 through the present 
time. There was no evidence that the county has not honored that 
contract. One witness for the Defense testified that he operated a 
grader for the County and only graded from the church to the 
Gardner home for several years. Others, however, testified that 
they graded the road from the termination of oiled road in Birdseye 
to the forest service property at least twice per year during the 
decades of the 60's and 70fs. 
See Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 2004, page 12, paragraph 2, sentence 3. 
11. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 29 of which Defendants' object is nearly verbatim to a 
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 29 states as 
follows: 
That the only testimony as to width of the Road was that of Clyde 
Nay lor, a qualified engineer and longtime director of public works 
for Utah County. Mr. Nay lor testified that a width of 20 feet plus a 
three foot shoulder on each side for a total width of 26 feet was 
reasonably necessary for anticipated travel. There being no 
evidence to the contrary the Court finds that the width of the 
roadway in this case should be 26 feet, including a 3 foot shoulder 
on each side. 
The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows: 
The only testimony on this point was that of Clyde Naylor, a 
qualified engineer and longtime director of public works for Utah 
County. Mr. Naylor testified that a width of 20 feet plus a three 
foot shoulder on each side for a total width of 26 feet was 
reasonably necessary for anticipated travel. There being no 
evidence to the contrary the Court finds that the width of the 
roadway in this case should be 26 feet, including a 3 foot shoulder 
on each side. 
See Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 2004, page 13, paragraph 4, sentence 2. 
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12. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 32[sic] of which Defendants' object is nearly verbatim to a 
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 31 states as 
follows: 
There was testimony that a locked gate was constructed in 1996 by 
Mr. Butler. There was also substantial testimony that many people 
were unable to travel the Road after that time without gaining 
permission or using a key provided by Mr. and Mrs. Butler. 
However, one exhibit shows a sign created by the County which 
allowed travel past the Butler gate, although admonishing travelers 
to close the gate and stay on the Road until arriving at the forest 
service. As noted above there have historically been gates across 
the Road for purposes unrelated to obstruction of traffic. An 
unlocked gate is consistent with this pattern and would not be 
considered to violate the right-of-way declared today. 
The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows: 
There was testimony that a locked gate was constructed in 1996 by 
Mr. Butler. There was also substantial testimony that many people 
were unable to travel the road after that time without gaining 
permission or using a key provided by Mr. and Mrs. Butler. 
However, one exhibit shows a gate created by the County which 
allowed travel past the Butler gate, although admonishing travelers 
to close the gate and stay on the road until arriving at the forest 
service. As noted above there have historically been gates across 
the road for purposes unrelated to obstruction of traffic. An 
unlocked gate is consistent with this pattern and would not be 
considered to violate the right-of-way declared today. 
See Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 2004, page 15, paragraph 2, sentence 1. 
13. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 33 of which Defendants' object is nearly verbatim to a 
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 33 states as 
follows: 
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The Road has been a public thoroughfare connecting a national 
forest and recreation area to a national roadway for decades and 
generations. 
1 he Cour I s I'\ lemorandum 1 . . . ^ . s: 
In this case, however, the evidence is clear and convincing that the 
road in question has been a public thoroughfare connecting a 
national forest and recreation area to a national highway for 
decades and generations. 
See Memorandum Decision dated June 16 20u4 ra^e 1 7. paragraph 2, sentence 3. 
14 Proposed Conclusionol ; ., - • .-..v,. iJelendants object is near!) verbatim to a 
lion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Conclusion of Law No. 7 states 
as follows: 
T iiii)""jilan' hd 'Hi i i" i , : ' K 0 . 
The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows: 
The Court concludes that the road was a pii \> •>,,. ;;,v •; oughfare before 
1980. 
See Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 2004} page 13, paragraph 2, sentence 
1. Plaintiffs further contend that proposed Con ::::lii ision of I a \ < 1 J : • J is i mixed 
finding of fact and conclusion of law. 
15. Proposed Conclusions of I .awNos. 8 and 9 of w 1 licl :t Defendants' object directly coincide 
to a portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Conclusions of Law Nos. 8 
and 9, respectively state as follows: 
8 Fhat having determined that the Road was dedicated and 
abandoned to the public before 1980 by clear and convincing 
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evidence, this Court must also determine the reasonable and 
necessary width of the Road. See Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910 
and 914 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(3). 
9. That the reasonable and necessary width of the Road to ensure safe 
travel is 26 feet, including a 20 foot wide travel width and three (3) 
foot shoulders on each side. 
The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows: 
Having determined that the Benny Creek road was a public 
highway before 1980 by clear and convincing evidence, this Court 
must also determine the reasonable and necessary width of the 
highway, Kohler v. Martin. 916 P.2d 910 and 914 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996), U.C.A. Section 72-5-104(3). The only testimony on this 
point was that of Clyde Nay lor, a qualified engineer and longtime 
director of public works for Utah County. Mr. Nay lor testified that 
a width of 20 feet plus a three foot shoulder on each side for a total 
width of 26 feet was reasonably necessary for anticipated travel. 
There being no evidence to the contrary the Court finds that the 
width of the roadway in this case should be 26 feet, including a 3 
foot shoulder on each side. 
See Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 2004, page 13, paragraph 4, sentence 
1. Plaintiffs further contend that proposed Conclusions of Law Nos. 8 and 9 are 
mixed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
16. Proposed Order No. 7 of which Defendants' object is permissible and in accordance with 
Rule 54(d)-(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, pursuant to Rule 54(e) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "the clerk must, within two days after the costs 
have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the 
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose . . ." (emphasis added). 
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after they are ascertained, which will later be filled in by the clerk. 
The above responses to Defendants' Objection surely demonstrate that Defendants in 
h'iilih i h|ivl I tin I ' IIIIIIIIII Mriiiiimiiiliim Divi'inui lu'i MU'IV PliiiiiliffV proposal hndiiijji;i ul 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order are nearly verbatim of the Memorandum Decision. An 
proposed changes are minor and are not substantive in nature. 
B. The Court Should Deny Defendants' Request for Oral Argument, or in the 
Alternative, Grant Plaintiffs' Request for an Expedited Hearing. 
Since plaintiffs' proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions ; : ,a\v. ana Order are nearly 
verbatim of the Memorandum Decision, oral argument with respect to Defendants' Objections is 
therefore not necessary. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants' Objection together with their 
R equest for Oral t \ig\ lment is an atten lpt tc • fi u thei :i "la;; > the openi :. I the 
Bennie Creek Road, especially as the hunting seasons approach. 
In the event, that the Court determines that a oral argument is warranted ;; Defendants' 
Objections, then Plaintiffs request an expedited hearing so as to minimize the impact on the 
public of the delay of opening the Bennie Creek Road. 
"HI " Plaintiffs Their i 
The Court should award Plaintiffs their reasonable attorney's fees for their bad faith 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, a court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if 
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the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or 
asserted in good faith. 
In this case, Plaintiffs' proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order are 
nearly verbatim of the Memorandum Decision. Defendants' Objection to the proposed Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order are in essence objections to the Court's Memorandum 
Decision and are without merit and in bad faith. Therefore, the Court should award Plaintiffs 
their reasonable attorney's fees in an amount to be determined by an attorney's fee affidavit. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should find that Plaintiffs' proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order are nearly verbatim of the Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 
2004 and uphold the same. The Court should deny Defendants' Request for Oral Argument, or 
in the alternative, grant Plaintiffs' request for an expedited hearing. The Court should award 
Plaintiffs their reasonable attorney's fees in an amount to be determined by an attorney's fee 
affidavit. Finally, the Court should also grant any other relief deemed appropriate. 
_ _ ^ _ „ 2004. 
PLAINTIFF UTAH COUNTY: 
i t . i m a n j , tuv v^v/utju. o i i u u i u CIIO\J g i a i i i cu 
DATED this (V. day of. 
M. CORT GI 
ROBERT J. MOORE 
Deputy Utah County Attorneys 
PLAINTIFF STATE OF UTAH; 
MARTIN B. BUSHMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Fourth Judicial District Cc 
of Utah County. SteuLor u 
/(f-fri 
IN THE FOURTH J U m n \ i DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY and STATE OF UTAH, by 
and through its DEPARTMENT OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES, DIVISIO? 
WILDLIFE RESOURCES, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RANDY BUTLER, DONNA BUTLER, 
MARGARET CONDLEY, MICHAEL E. 
CONDLEY, ELIZABETH CONDLEY, 
BLAINE EVANS, LINDA EVANS and 
JOHN DOES 1 through 15, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
ORDER 
Civil No. 000403372 
Division No. 7 
Judge James R. Taylor 
0 152 
This matter came before the Court on a bench trial consisting of June 1st, 2nd, 7 th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 
14th, and 15th, 2004. Plaintiff Utah County was represented by M. Cort Griffin and Robert J. Moore, 
Deputy Utah County Attorneys. Plaintiff State of Utah, by and through its Department of Natural 
Resources, Division of Wildlife Resources, was represented by Martin B. Bushman, Assistant Utah 
Attorney General. Defendants Randy Butler, Donna Butler, Blaine Evans, and Donna Evans were 
represented by Mark E. Arnold and Scott Wiggins, of Arnold & Wiggins, P.C. 
The Court has reviewed the file, heard evidence at trial, issued a Memorandum Decision 
dated June 16, 2004, and upon being advised in the premises, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court makes the following findings of fact based upon the clear and convincing evidence 
presented at trial, the admissions of Defendants, and the addition of the Butler Family Trust: 
1. That Defendants Randy Butler and Donna Butler are individuals residing in Utah County, 
Utah, and are the trustees and/or successor trustees of the Butler Family Trust dated the April 
11,2002, which is the owner of record of certain real properties more particularly described 
as follows: 
COM N 89 DEG 58'01"E ALONG SEC LINE 2661.78 FT FR NW COR 
SEC 26, T10S, R3E, SLM; S 89 DEG 29'48"E 402.48 FT; S 12 DEG 
07'30"W1083.73 FT; N 84 DEG 25'25"W 491.21 FT; N 86 DEG 46'28"W 
114.33 FT; S 77 DEG 44'11"W 78.72 FT; S 59 DEG 32'05"W 73.23 FT; S 
48 DEG 34'23"W 81.42 FT; S 66 DEG 14'50"W 60.21 FT; S 88 DEG 
10'49"W 73.18 FT; N 79 DEG 55'36"W 86.59 FT; N 20 DEG 49"W 444.56 
FT; N 13 DEG 12'01"W 265.17 FT; N 31 DEG 28'45"W 353.97 FT; N 61 
DEG 03'58"W 244.51 FT; N 16 DEG 47'16"W 346.47 FT; N 12 DEG 
28'38MW 368.34 FT; N 89 DEG 26'04"W 1047.86 FT; N 1 DEG 42'24"W 
672.01 FT; S 8 DEG 50'11"E 1330.15 FT; S I DEG 47'12"E 1315.76 FT; N 
89 DEG 58*01 "E 1330.89 FT TO BEG. AREA 56.76 ACRES. 
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ALSO: COM SW COR SbU ZJ, i lOS, R3E, SLM; IN I ucv 42'24"W 
671.48 FT; S 89 DEG 26'04"E 1047.86 FT; S 12 DEG 28'38"E 368.34 FT; 
S 16 DEG 47'16"E 346.47 FT; S 61 DEG 03'58"E 244.51 FT; S 31 DEG 
28'45"E 353.97 FT; S 13 DEG 12'01 "E 265.17 FT; S 20 DEG 00*49"E 444.56 
FT; N 79 DEG 55'36"W 30.66 FT; N 81 DEG 57'45"W 80 FT; N 77 DEG 
09'25"W 503.28 FT; S 83 DEG 57'05"W 131.47 FT; N 83 DEG 21T7"W 
364.54 FT; N 65 DEG 44'39"W 278.69 FT; N 55 DEG 47'09"W 218.59 FT; 
N 63 DEG 31'54"W 325.32 FT; N 587.40 FT TO BEG. AREA 50.30 
ACRES. 
ALSO: COM. AT NE COR OF SEC 27, 1 I u S, R 3 E, SLM; S 8.90 CHS; 
N 63 3/8 W 19.86 CHS; 1. 1" "" CHS TO BEG. AREA 7.81 ACRES. 
ALSO: M.. • i 
ACRES. 
2. That Defendants Blaine Evans and Linda Evans are individuals residing in Utah County, 
State of Utah, and aiu iln mum , ul n nml nl in dun n ,il propiiln , ininc p,n In ul,u \\ 
described as follows: 
BEG. 10 CHS S OF NW COR OF SEC 26, T 10 S, R 3 E, SLM; S TO THE 
TOP OF THE "GARDNER KNOLL" 19 CHS M OR 1; N-NE ALONG 
EXISTING FENCE LINE TO A PT S 63 E 8.65 CHS TO EXISTING COR 
POST; N 63 W 8.65 CHS M OR 1 TO BEG. AREA 8.22 ACRES M OR 1. 
ALSO: COM AT SW COR. SEC. 27, R10S, R3E, SLB&M.; N u DEG 
10'6"W 2651.35 FT; N 0 DEG 10'6"W 2651.35 FT; S 89 DEG 58 iO"E 
2640.89 FT; S 89 DEG 58'10"E 1467.41 FT; S 63 DEG 23'0"E 1316.6 FT; 
S 0 DEG 21'14"E 2078.28 FT; S 0 DEG 21'14"E 1333.77 FT; N 89 DEG 
42'26"W 1323.7 FT; S 0 DEG 18'27"E 1331.74 FT; N 89 DEG 37'13"W 
1324.8 FT; N 89 DEG 3713"W 2649.6 FT TO BEG. AREA 597 515 AC. 
ALSO: Sl/2 OF SW1/4 & SW1/4 OF SE1/4 OF SEC 22, 1 ! S. k 3 h, 
SLM. AREA 120 ACRES. 
ALSO: Nl/2 Ui' b\ . ; > ' ' ' = >' SI l -'. SEC 22, T 10 S, R 3 E, SLM. 
AREA 160 ACRES. 
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3. That the Bennie Creek Road (hereinafter referred to as "Road") commences at or near 
Birdseye, Utah at a junction with U.S. Highway 89, located in Section 25, Township 10 
South, Range 3 East Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
4. That from the Road's junction with U.S. Highway 89, it continues approximately 2.5 miles 
in a westerly direction through Sections 25,26,27 and 22, Township 10 South, Range 3 East 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian until it reaches the western edge of the Uinta National Forest. 
5. That over 60 witnesses testified at trial recalling facts and circumstances from as early as 
1927. Nearly half provided the Court with memories preceding 1960. None of the 
witnesses, in view of the Court, attempted to mis-lead or do anything other than give an 
honest and complete recitation of what they recall. Even so, when the testimony is compared 
to pictures, maps and other testimony some statements must be given greater credibility than 
others. 
6. That the Road follows a route of travel from U.S. Highway 89 near the "Birdseye Church" 
and has extended west toward the Uinta National Forest since before the memory of any 
witness. 
7. That an ariel photo taken in 1946 clearly shows the Road extending from the highway into 
the vicinity of the national forest. 
8. That Madge Truman and Ginnie Johnson both testified that their family owned the property 
now owned by Defendants Randy Butler and Donna Butler (hereinafter referred to as 
"Gardner Property") from 1927 until 1963 and that they lived on the property along the Road 
from 1925 or 1933 (depending upon which sister is considered) until 1949. During that time 
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tl ieR oadv asti a i eledt ;; the pi lblic often ai id no attempts were made by the family to restrict 
or deny access to the Road to any members of the public. 
property between 1947 and 1955. Ile also hunted in the area every year until 1965, lie 
testified that his father "made arrangement •. ...... iardner to move sheep across \ i:. 
Gardner's property on the way to the forest service propeirty. Defendants insist that this 
travel was, therefore, by permission I lowever. •.•*. J. ^ son did not participate in the 
ilisnissinns jtiidl I NII ill i (unlii \ lim lln ,u iliiuil aiuinp n-.-is w leceased. It was apparent that 
the Gardners had cattle on their property. Care needed to be taken to not allow the sheep to 
were just as likely an effort to work out the details of the operation as to gain permission to 
travel the Road. 
That Duane Newitt, Ron Davis, Renae Swenson, Glen Roberts, Norris Dalton, Youd Barney, 
Hugh Tangren, Don Daley, Craig Ingram, and Glen Thatcher, all personally used the kudu 
recreation including hunting, fishing, camping, and sightseeing in the 1940fs and 50's. 
None of them encountered locked gates on the Road or sought permission to use the Road. 
and Hugh Tangren, drove vehicles well into forest service property. 
T i l 11 III I ' l l I Ill II II H Is* I l« III U . i i II IIII11 UN l u l ill1 II 111 I \\\ ill 11III II M | I II II 111)' I I I U l j i i 111 Ih 1'* 1 Ml I " 
worse in the wetter times of the year and occasionally restricted travel by vehicle, but not by 
foot, horseback, or horse drawn wagon. Winter snow was not plowed off the Road. 
Nevertheless, the evidence is clear and convincing that for at least 10 years prior to 1958 the 
road was open and traveled by the public as often as necessary or convenient, interrupted 
vehicular travel only by naturally occurring conditions such as groundwater (spring water) 
in wet years and snow in the winter. The springs and bogs in the Road were passable on 
foot, horseback or by wagon even when vehicle access was restricted. 
12. That Defendant Randy Butler and his parents (J. Lee Butler and Diane Butler), defense 
witnesses, recalled family hunting trips between 1958 and 1962 when family members 
accompanied the family patriarch, Barney Newitt (Diane Butler's father, Randy Butler's 
grandfather) to a location in Sanpete County to obtain a key before traveling up the Road to 
camp just below the bog on the property now owned by Defendants Blaine and Linda Evans. 
Randy Butler has a particularly vivid memory from approximately 1952 when, at age 7, he 
saw his grandfather get out of the truck to unlock a gate and spotted a buck which he shot 
before opening the gate to allow continued travel on the road. Contrasted against this vivid 
and believable recollection, however, is other important evidence. Only the Poulson family 
has been identified as property owners who lived in Sanpete County. Barney Newitt and 
Grandmother Poulsen, to whom he would have spoken in 1958 to 1962 about a key are both 
deceased. Steve Poulson testified that to his knowledge the only locked gate on the Poulson 
property during that time was on a side road branching south off the Road toward an old 
bunkhouse. Duane Newitt, the brother of Diane Butler, testified that he camped and hunted 
with the family during those years and does not recall any locked gates. Nineteen other 
witnesses testified that they traveled the Road for a variety of purposes during that time and 
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never encountered any locked gates. None of the other witnesses ever felt it necessary to 
obtain permission from property owners to travel the Road. 
13. That Virgil Neeves, a defense witness, testified that between 1958 and 1980 there was a 
cable gate across a cattle guard west of the Gardner home (the last home traveling west 
toward the forest service property, now occupied by Defendants Randy Butler and Donna 
Butler) which was locked most of the time. He specifically recalled a "cock fight" up the 
Road in 1972 when only people who were supposed to participate were given keys to the 
gate. A cock fight, of course, is an illegal activity and the one time use of the gate to 
discourage discovery or participation by persons not known to the participants can hardly be 
considered to be a termination of general public access. Mr. Neeves' other access to the area 
was usually across country from the property he worked to the north (the Dixon Ranch) to 
work on water diversion works along Bennie Creek. He saw people stuck on the Road and 
recalls a cable across a cattle guard on the Road to stop cars. His memories are simply 
confused and inconsistent with all of the other testimony about obstructions on the Road in 
question. Further, there is evidence of a cable across a side road belonging to the Poulson 
family, and a gate and cattle guard on the Road at the Forest Boundary. 
14. That Mike Condley, a defense witness, testified that he lived in the area from 1970 until 
1979. Although he does not recall any locks after 1979, he firmly recalled a locked gate near 
the Gardner (Butler) home. However, no other witness corroborates this point and 
descriptions of locked gates by the Butler family, Defendant Blaine Evans and others put 
Page 7 of 20 
0 * 1 5 2 0 
locked gates farther west, near the present cattle guard between the Butler home and forest 
service property. 
15. That Elizabeth Condley, a defense witness, testified that between 1967 and 1977 the gates 
were never locked in the summer but that they were locked late in every fall. However, her 
testimony was that she traveled the Road on horseback during the summer. There was 
nothing given to explain how she could have known that the gate was locked in the fall. 
16. That the heaviest use of the Road was clearly for hunting deer and elk in the fall season. 
Several dozen witness testified that they personally hunted the area between 1958 and 1980 
and never encountered locked gates or were otherwise prevented from using the Road. 
Division of Wildlife Resources officer Gurley and Briggs patrolled the area to check hunters 
and fishermen from 1958 through 1996. Dale Gurley, in particular, patrolled between 1968 
and 1991 sometimes observing as many as 25 or 30 hunters in the forest service area who 
had traveled up the Road to hunt. Officer Gurley never encountered locked gates and never 
needed permission to access the area to check on hunters and fishermen. Kent Cornaby, 
Forest Service supervisor, routinely traveled the Road during the 60fs and 70's for personal 
and professional purposes. Entrance to the forest service during that time was marked by 
signs. 
17. That Shirlene Otteson, a Plaintiffs witness, testified that her family purchased the Gardner 
property in 1964 and owned it until 1981. During that time she was regularly on the property 
with her husband and children. The Road was considered and treated by her family as a 
public road during that time. No attempt was made to close the Road during that time. 
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There was testimony that one defense witness, John Mendenhall, was told by Mrs. Otteson's 
father, Mr. Roach, to stop hunting and leave his property. However, Mr. Mendenhall 
testified that he was a teenager with three other teenagers and no adult. Mr. Mendenhall was 
hunting well off the Road on the Roach (Gardner/now Butler) property. Ordering teenagers 
to leave in such a circumstance hardly equates with restricting travel on the Road. 
That there was testimony that the Road is periodically used to deliver irrigation water to 
property along the Road and that when that occurs, the Road becomes impassable. However, 
neither the Gardner family nor the Otteson (Roach) families used that method of irrigation, 
covering a period from 1925-1981. A clear and convincing majority of witnesses further 
traveled the Road unrestricted by irrigation practices. 
That there was substantial testimony about signs along the Road. The Defendants have 
insisted that there were many signs, perpendicular to the Road, coupled with posts painted 
yellow and orange clearly designating the area as private property. Most of Plaintiffs' 
witnesses testified that they saw the signs but considered them warning against leaving the 
Road but not a warning against traveling on the Road. The evidence was that the signs were 
placed on various locations along the edge of the Road west of the Gardner home to the 
forest boundary and, in particular, around a wire gate in the vicinity of a present cattle guard. 
Members of the public encountering signs posting property as provided by Utah Code Ann. 
§23-20-14 would have to conclude, based upon Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-14, that they were 
at a property line or on the edge of private property, meaning that where they are standing 
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is not restricted. Signs and painted posts along a fence running parallel to a road, regardless 
of the physical juxtaposition of the sign, more clearly indicate the fence as a boundary than 
prohibiting travel along the road from which the signs can be seen. The signs and painted 
posts in this case clearly did what the Plaintiffs' witnesses assumed, they prohibited travel 
off of the Road, not on the Road. There was no testimony that any signs stated "Road 
Closed." 
20. That there was testimony regarding four gates on the Road between U.S. Highway 89 and 
the Uinta National Forest. Traveling west from the highway, the first gate location is near the 
Gardner home (presently the Randy and Donna Butler home). All but one witness described 
the versions of this gate prior to 1996 as a drift wire gate that was never locked. All testified 
and believed it was used to assist in livestock operations and not to restrict general travel on 
the Road. 
21. The second gate to the west was within 100 yards of a present cattle gate. Also a wire gate, 
most witnesses did not recall any locks and that the gate was only occasionally closed. These 
witnesses believed that, again, the gate was for use with livestock operations and not 
intended to restrict travel on the Road. There was also testimony, however, that this gate was 
locked on occasion after 1980 and the implication was that this was the gate unlocked by 
Barney Newitt in the late 50's and early 60's. Remnants of the gate sill exist, including a 
weathered piece of plywood which was brought into court. This evidence is simply too 
skimpy and too removed to conclude that the fence was locked and signed to disrupt public 
Page 10 of 20 
001517 
travel particularly in the face of all the witness who regularly traveled the Road and recalled 
no locks or road restrictions. 
22. That there was testimony of a "white gate" constructed of lumber and located near an ancient 
bridge spanning one of the ditches or streams crossing the Road. One witness testified that 
the gate had been locked on one occasion and one exhibit includes a picture of a yellow pole 
described as the remnants of a bridge. However, again, this minimal evidence is 
overwhelmed by the substantial testimony of persons who used and drove the Road in all 
seasons between 1925 and 1980 without encountering any locked gate. 
23. The fourth gate is at the entrance to the forest service property, which was formerly a wire 
livestock gate, has been replaced with a cattle guard. A metal gate nearby allows horses and 
livestock to move through the fence when required. There has been a sign there indicating 
the entrance to the forest service for at least 35 years and the forest service property has 
clearly been fenced in the memory of all witnesses. A sign, still on the gate, asks users to 
"please close the gate." The sign is presently on the metal gate. The obstruction was 
obviously intended to restrict the travel of cattle and sheep, not people. 
24. That the Road connects U.S. Highway 89 and the Uinta National Forest. Paths and trails 
from the top or terminus of the Road travel over the mountain and connect to the Nebo Loop 
Road. 
25. That during certain seasons and at certain times between 1925 and 1980 there were springs 
or ditches which created bogs at times making vehicular or wagon travel through or around 
the bogs difficult or impossible. Nevertheless, travel by foot or horse was not restricted and 
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there was regular maintenance performed on the Road by Utah County, the United States 
Forest Service and landowners during that time. The Road was graded as needed or 
following significant storms during the 1950fs. The County has had a contract with the forest 
service requiring them to maintain the Road from 1974 through the present time. There was 
no evidence that the County has not honored that contract. One witness for the Defense 
testified that he operated a grader for the County and only graded from the church to the 
Gardner home for several years. Others, however, testified that they graded the Road from 
the termination of oiled road in Birdseye to the forest service property at least twice per year 
during the decades of the 60fs and 70fs. 
26. That the testimony established a wide variety of uses including travel to the forest service and 
adjoining private property for fishing, deer hunting, elk hunting, cougar hunting (during the 
winter), hiking, family outings, general sightseeing, labor on irrigation headwaters, 
movement of cattle and sheep, law enforcement related to wildlife regulations, and 
maintenance of forest trails and signs by forest service employees. 
27. That vehicles, horses, trailers, hikers, bikes and motorcycles all at various times traveled the 
entire length of the Road ending on forest service property. 
28. That the Court finds, by clear and convincing evidence that even if it is concluded (which 
this Court does not) that the Road was gated and locked in the late 50's and early 60fs as 
described by the Butler's, the Road was used as necessary and convenient by the public for 
more than 10 years before that time and, again, 10 years after that time. 
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That the only testimony as to width of the Road was that of Clyde Naylor, a qualified 
engineer and longtime director of public works for Utah County. Mr. Naylor testified that 
a width of 20 feet plus a three foot shoulder on each side for a total width of 26 feet was 
reasonably necessary for anticipated travel. There being no evidence to the contrary the Court 
finds that the width of the roadway in this case should be 26 feet, including a 3 foot shoulder 
on each side. 
The Court notes that a legal description of the centerline of the Road generated from a survey 
of the Road itself was introduced into evidence. The description was challenged by counsel 
for the Defendants since it appears to lie in a different township or range than the legal 
description of the Defendants' properties. Testimony was also presented that indicated that 
several years ago the adjoining property owners agreed to establish their respective 
boundaries as the center of the roadway and confirmed that agreement by recorded boundary 
line agreement. No expert testimony was presented to assist this Court to determine if there 
is a conflict in the two positions or how such a conflict, if it exists, should be resolved. The 
Court merely determines, today, that the Road as it presently exists is a public highway, 20 
feet wide with a three foot shoulder on each side. 
There was testimony that a locked gate was constructed in 1996 by Mr. Butler. There was 
also substantial testimony that many people were unable to travel the Road after that time 
without gaining permission or using a key provided by Mr. and Mrs. Butler. However, one 
exhibit shows a sign created by the County which allowed travel past the Butler gate, 
although admonishing travelers to close the gate and stay on the Road until arriving at the 
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forest service. As noted above there have historically been gates across the Road for 
purposes unrelated to obstruction of traffic. An unlocked gate is consistent with this pattern 
and would not be considered to violate the right-of-way declared today. 
32. That for some of the time since construction of the metal Butler gate in 1997 it has been 
locked and the Road has been obstructed and for some of the time it has not. No evidence 
was presented to clarify how many of the intervening 2,561 days were days when the Road 
was obstructed and how many were not. The Plaintiffs, as the moving party in seeking to 
obtain the penalty, had the burden of providing specific evidence of the number of days the 
Defendants have been in violation. Merely showing initial service and testimony that 
persons were stopped from time to time during the last 6 or 7 years does not meet that 
burden. Inasmuch as the Court cannot determine with reasonable precision the number of 
days during which a violation of the State statute and County ordinances existed no penalty 
can be imposed. 
33. The Road has been a public thoroughfare connecting a national forest and recreation area to 
a national roadway for decades and generations. 
34. That Plaintiffs are the prevailing party and are therefore entitled to recover reasonable costs 
of court to be established by affidavit. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court hereby makes the following Conclusions of Law relying in whole or in part upon 
the foregoing Findings of Fact: 
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1. That the Road has been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public because it has been 
continuously used a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §72-5-104 (and its predecessor statute Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89). 
2. That three factors must be established by clear and convincing evidence in order for a route 
to be deemed a dedicated highway, abandoned to the use of the public under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 72-5-104: "there must be (i) continuous use, (ii) as a public thoroughfare, (iii) for a period 
often years. ...Once the technical provision of [the statute] have been satisfied, the road is 
a 'public highway.' The court has no discretion to ignore that fact." Campbell v. Box Elder 
County, 962 P.2d 806 at 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) citing Hebert City Corp. v. Simpson. 942 
P.2d 307 at 310 (Utah 1997). That Plaintiffs successfully proved each of the foregoing 
factors by clear and convincing evidence. 
3. That there is no requirement of proof of the owner's intent to offer the road to the public. 
Bertagnole v. Pine Meadows Ranches, 639 P.2d 211 at 213 (Utah, 1981); see also Draper 
City v. Estate of Bernardo. 888 P.2d 1097 at 1099 (Utah, 1995) and Thurman v. Bvram. 626 
P.2d 445 at 449 (Utah 1981). 
4. That continuous use is established where "the public has made a continuous and 
uninterrupted use of the road as often as they found it convenient or necessary." Campbell. 
962 P.2d at 809. The "use may be continuous though not constant...provided it occurred as 
often as the claimant had occasion to choose to pass. Mere intermission is not interruption." 
Id at 809 (citing Richards v. Pines Ranch. Inc.. 559 P.2d 948 (Utah 1977). 
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That Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-14 provides a mechanism for private property owners to 
restrict sportsman access to their property by posting: 
"Properly posted" means that "No Trespassing" signs or a minimum of 100 
square inches of bright yellow, bright orange, or flourescent paint are 
displayed at all corners, fishing streams crossing property lines, roads, gates, 
and rights-of-way entering the land. If metal fence posts are used, the entire 
exterior side must be painted." 
The plain and obvious intent of the statute is to require physical notation or warning at the 
entrance or on the edge of property. Members of the public encountering such signs would 
have to conclude, based upon the statute, that they were at a property line or on the edge of 
private property, meaning that where they are standing is not restricted. Signs and painted 
posts along a fence running parallel to a road, regardless of the physical juxtaposition of the 
sign, more clearly indicate the fence as a boundary than prohibiting travel along the road 
from which the signs can be seen. The signs and painted posts in this case clearly did what 
the plaintiffs' witnesses assumed-they prohibited travel off of the road, not on the road. 
That the term "thoroughfare" is not defined in any Utah statute. Competent legal authority 
defines the term as a "street or way opening at both ends into another street or public 
highway, so that one can go through and get out of it without returning. It differs from a cul 
de sac, which is open only at one end." Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Banks-Baldwin Law 
Publishing Company, Cleveland: 1946. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that: 
[w]hile it is difficult to fix a standard by which the measure what is a public 
use or a public thoroughfare, it can be said here that the road was used by 
many and different persons for a variety of purposes; that it was open to all 
who desired to use it; that the use made of it was as general and extensive as 
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the situation and surroundings would permit, had the road been formally laid 
out as a pubic highway by public authority." 
Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnos. 75 Utah 384, 285 P. 646 at 648 (Utah 1929). 
The court has also stated that a "'thoroughfare' is a place or way through which there is 
passing or travel. It becomes a 'public thoroughfare' when the public have a general right of 
passage." Gilmore v. Carter. 15 U.2d 280, 291 P.2d 426 at 428 (Utah 1964). 
In another case evidence that the road was generally impassable, that the road failed to 
connect or lead to public property and that there had been only minimal maintenance were 
reasons to overturn a determination by summary judgment that a proposed road was a 
highway. Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo. 888 P.2d 1097 at 1100-1101 (Utah 1995). Of 
course the Draper City case did not determine that the road known as the "Lower Canyon 
Corner Road" could not be determined to be a public highway in the face of such evidence, 
only that the issue could not be resolved via summary judgment. This case is in a 
substantially different posture. 
7. That the Road was a public thoroughfare before 1980. 
8. That having determined that the Road was dedicated and abandoned to the public before 
1980 by clear and convincing evidence, this Court must also determine the reasonable and 
necessary width of the Road. See Kohler v. Martin. 916 P.2d 910 and 914 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996), Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(3). 
9. That the reasonable and necessary width of the Road to ensure safe travel is 26 feet, 
including a 20 foot wide travel width and three (3) foot shoulders on each side. 
Page 17 of 20 
n ' i i £ i n 
10. That Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 provides that any person who installs, places or maintains 
a structure within the right-of-way of a highway must remove the structure within ten days 
upon notice. Upon failure to remove the structure "[a] highway authority may recover . . . 
. (b) $10 for each day the installation remained within the right-of-way after notice was 
complete." 
11. Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable costs of court as the prevailing party to be established by 
affidavit. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby ordered, 
adjudged, and decreed as follows: 
1. That the Road from the gate at the Butler residence to the Uinta National Forest Boundary 
is hereby declared a public highway within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §72-5-104 (and 
its predecessor statute Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89). 
2. That the location of Road is where it presently exists. 
3. That the scope (or width) of the right-of-way of the Road west of the gate at the Butler 
Residence is 26 feet, including a 3 foot shoulder on each side and a 20 foot travel width, the 
centerline of which is the center of the exiting Bennie Creek Road. 
4. That the Defendants and their successors and assigns shall not take any action that blocks, 
locks, or otherwise interferes with public access to the Road. 
5. That the Defendants immediately remove any and all structures, blockages, gates, fences or 
anything that blocks, locks, or otherwise interferes with public access across the Road. 
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6. That Plaintiff Utah County's request for judgment, joint and several, against Defendants 
Randy Butler and Donna Butler at the rate of $10 per day from July 29, 1997 to the date of 
the order, plus interest at the legal rate from the date of judgment is hereby denied. 
7. That Plaintiffs are>awarded judgment, joint and several, against Defendants Randy Butler and 
Donna Butter, Blaine and Linda Evans for reasonable costs of courtdetermined by a verified 
bill of costs pursuant to URCP Rule 54 in the amount of $ for Utah County 
<*>^ and $ for the State of Utah. 
8. Plaintiff Utah County is ordered to record this Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order in the records of the Utah County Recorder. 
9. For interest on the Judgement at the legal rate from date of the entry of judgment. 
DATED this / (p day of 
n 
4 
Notice of objections must be submitted to the Court an<H^9aaa^*within five (5) days after 
service, pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER, postage prepaid, th i s /^day off ll<M(J^ . 2004, 
to the following: ,j 
MARKE. ARNOLD 
Arnold & Wiggins, P.C. 
57 West 200 South #105 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
MARTIN B. BUSHMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
1594 West North Temple, Suite 2110 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 / / / O 
L:\Rob\Civil Litigation\Bennie Creek RoadVPleadingsVFindings at^-Co^usions-Final.wpd 
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ORIGINAL 
SCOTT L WIGGINS (582 0) 
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, P.C. 
American Plaza II, Suite 105 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-4333 
Facsimile: (801) 328-2405 
Attorneys for Defendants / Appellants 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY and STATE OF UTAH, 
by and through its DEPARTMENT ) Case No. 000403372 
OF NATURAL RESOURCES, DIVISION ) Division No. 7 
OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES, ) 
Plaintiffs / Appellees, ) 
v. ) 
RANDY BUTLER, DONNA BUTLER, ) 
MARGARET CONDLEY, ELIZABETH ) 
CONDLEY, BLAINE EVANS, LINDA ) 
EVANS, and JOHN DOES 1-15, ) 
Defendants / Appellants. ) Judge James R. Taylor 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Randy Butler, Donna Butler, 
Blaine Evans, and Linda Evans, by and through counsel, Scott L 
Wiggins, of and for Arnold & Wiggins, P.C, hereby appeals to the 
Utah Supreme Court from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
, : ^ 
o Of* y 
oni«oo 
and Order of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah, Utah 
County, the Honorable James R. Taylor, presiding, which was 
signed by the district court on August 16, 2004, and entered that 
same day. 
DATED this 15th day of September, 2004. 
INS, P.C. 
fendants / 
Appellants 
! CERTIFY THAT THIS 3 A TRUE COPY OF 
AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT OJNifilL&IN THE 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DiSTF 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTA£ 
DATE: 
^M&**§* 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, being duly sworn, state that I, as 
appellate counsel for Defendants Randy Butler, Donna Butler, 
Blaine Evans, and Linda Evans, served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL upon the parties listed below by 
placing the same in an envelope addressed to: 
Mr. M. Cort Griffin 
Mr. Robert J. Moore 
Deputy Utah County Attorneys 
100 East Center Street, Suite 2400 
Provo, UT 84 606 
Counsel for Utah County 
Mr. Martin B. Bushman 
Assistant Attorney General 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
1594 West North Temple, Suite 2110 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Counsel for State of Utah, Department of 
Natural Resources, Division of Wildlife 
Resources 
and causing the same to be mailed First Class, postage prepaid, 
on the 15th of September, 2004. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss . 
) 
Personally appeared before me SCOTT L WIGGINS and signed the 
foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE on this jfT day of September, 
2004. 
" "Notary Public""" Hi 
CYDNIEKAESAMORA. 
919 North Cathwkw Street I 
8alt Lake Ctty, Utah 84116 . 
MyCommfeaionExplfte | 
_ January 30» 2006 
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